G.R. No. L-3430 and L-3431; May 23, 1951.
PAZ E. SIGUION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GO TECSON, ETC., defendant-appellant. ALBERTO MAXIMO TORRES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GO TECSON, ETC., defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On October 1, 1927, Paulino P. Gocheco mortgaged a piece of registered real property in Manila to Paz E. Siguion to secure a debt of P30,000. About ten years later, he constituted a second mortgage on the same property in favor of Alberto Maximo Torres to secure a debt of P20,000. Both mortgages were duly registered. Gocheco died in 1943 without discharging the mortgages. In 1944, proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Go Tecson was appointed judicial administrator. On February 3, 1949, separate actions were filed against administrator Go Tecson for the foreclosure of the two mortgages. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant administrator appealed, contending the lower court erred in not holding: (1) that he could no longer be sued as administrator because the administration proceedings had already been closed; (2) that the matter was res judicata; (3) that the plaintiffs’ claim had been paid; and (4) that Republic Act No. 342 (which lifted the moratorium on prewar debts subject to conditions) was unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE

The main issues are whether the lower court erred in: (1) not holding the administrator could no longer be sued due to closed proceedings; (2) not holding the matter was res judicata; (3) not finding the mortgage debt had been paid; and (4) not addressing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342 .

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
(1) The first assignment of error was without merit. A certificate from the Clerk of Court showed the order for distribution of the estate had not been complied with, and appellant’s counsel admitted the administration proceedings were technically still pending.
(2) The claim of res judicata was unsupported. The record did not show the mortgage indebtedness was formally filed, litigated, and judicially determined in the administration proceedings. A 1944 court order merely noted the mortgagee’s willingness to accept payment upon notice from the administrator, but did not indicate a formal claim had been filed. Without such formality, the mortgagees did not waive their mortgage lien and were not estopped from bringing a foreclosure suit.
(3) The alleged payment was not proven. The only evidence was the testimony of the administrator’s former attorney, Judge Bienvenido Tan, which was denied by appellee Paz E. Siguion. Judge Tan’s inference of acceptance from her words was unwarranted; her statements indicated a refusal to accept payment, consistent with her previous refusals and the context of depreciated currency in October 1944. No receipt, release, or discharge of mortgage was signed, and the money was not even counted.
(4) The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342 was not a necessary issue. The record showed appellant did not definitively invoke the moratorium as a defense in the court below; it was not pleaded in the answer nor made a ground for a motion to dismiss. The answer admitted the moratorium had been lifted by Republic Act No. 342 , subject to conditions not applicable to the estate. A withdrawn petition to amend the answer to challenge the Act’s constitutionality did not properly raise the issue. The Court therefore did not pass on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342 .