G.R. No. L-34161. February 29, 1972.
EUGENE A. TAN, SILVESTRE J. ACEJAS and ROGELIO V. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas, and Rogelio V. Fernandez, suing as taxpayers and purportedly on behalf of the Filipino people, filed a petition for declaratory relief. They sought to assail the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution (Resolution No. 2127) of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The petitioners argued that the Constitutional Convention, under Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6132 , was without power to consider proposals that would revise the Constitution by adopting a form of government different from the existing one. They contended the Convention was merely empowered to propose improvements without altering the Constitution’s general plan.
The Court initially dismissed the petition on October 8, 1971, for lack of merit. The petitioners subsequently filed a more extensive motion for reconsideration, heavily relying on secondary authorities like American Jurisprudence to support their position that the Convention’s powers were limited to amendments, not revision. The motion placed the issue before the Court En Banc for final resolution.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) Whether the petitioners possessed the requisite legal standing to challenge the Constitutional Convention resolution; and (2) Whether the judiciary could properly intervene to determine the scope of the Convention’s powers at that stage of its proceedings.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration, affirming the dismissal of the petition. On the issue of standing, the Court held that the petitioners lacked the requisite personal and substantial interest. The “direct injury” test, as articulated in People v. Vera, requires that a party impugning a statute or official act must sustain or will sustain direct injury from its enforcement. While there has been a relaxation for taxpayer suits involving the disbursement of public funds, and while Senators have been accorded standing in cases raising constitutional questions affecting their institution, the petitioners here did not qualify under any recognized category. The Court emphasized it retains discretion in entertaining taxpayer suits and found no compelling reason to exercise it here.
More fundamentally, the Court ruled that the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of judicial restraint barred the exercise of jurisdiction at that time. Citing precedents like Planas v. Gil, the judiciary must avoid directing or restraining executive or legislative action prematurely. This principle applies with even greater force to a coordinate, sovereign body like the Constitutional Convention. The Court held that as long as the Convention was still deliberating and had not yet finalized any specific proposal for submission to the electorate, the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. Judicial inquiry must await a concrete act—such as the final adoption of a proposal for ratification—before it can be properly challenged in an appropriate proceeding. To interfere beforehand would violate the Convention’s autonomy and the constitutional design. The petition was thus dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.