G.R. No. L-34122 August 29, 1988
FRUCTUOSO GARCIA, ALFREDO SUERTE, and CAMILO SABLAY, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ABELARDO APORTADERA, as Presiding Judge, CFI, Cotabato, Br. IV, AURELIO AMPIG, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS of the Province of Cotabato, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners filed a complaint to annul Homestead Patent No. 112146 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title issued to respondent Aurelio Ampig for a 4.4061-hectare parcel of land. They alleged the land was part of a 24-hectare area originally applied for by their father, Marcelo Garcia. After his death, petitioner Fructuoso Garcia renewed the homestead application in his own name in 1946. Petitioners claimed Ampig, who was allegedly hired as a tenant on the land, surreptitiously filed his own homestead application in 1955. Although initially denied, a patent was issued to Ampig in 1965. Petitioners argued this issuance was through mistake or oversight by the Director of Lands.
The Director of Lands, in his answer, asserted that Ampig’s application was filed regularly in 1955. Fructuoso Garcia only filed a telegraphic protest ten years later in 1965 and failed to submit a formal protest despite being advised to do so. Consequently, the Bureau of Lands considered the matter closed and issued the patent to Ampig after he complied with legal requirements. The Director contended the court action was premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the petitioners lacked the legal personality to sue.

ISSUE

The primary issues were whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for the petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies and on the ground that they were not the proper parties to institute the action for annulment of a homestead patent.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The ruling was anchored on two key legal principles. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is firmly established. Where a party seeks the cancellation of a free patent, the action must first be pursued within the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Judicial review is not permitted unless these administrative avenues are fully exhausted. The petitioners’ own motion for reconsideration admitted they had a pending petition before the Bureau of Lands, confirming the administrative process was ongoing and not yet concluded.
Second, the action was properly characterized as one for reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act ( Commonwealth Act No. 141 ). This provision mandates that all actions for the reversion of lands of the public domain to the government shall be instituted by the Solicitor General. The suit is essentially in the name of the state. Even if the patent were annulled for fraud, the land would revert to the public domain; the court cannot directly award it to a private applicant. The Director of Lands retains exclusive executive control over the disposition of public lands. The petitioners, being mere homestead applicants and not recognized owners, could not convert this into a private action for reconveyance, which is a remedy available only to a proven owner whose property was erroneously registered in another’s name. Therefore, the petitioners were not the proper parties to initiate the suit.