G.R. No. L-34082. April 27, 1972
HI CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PRICE CONTROL COUNCIL, et al., respondents.

FACTS

HI Cement Corporation filed a petition for prohibition challenging the legality and constitutionality of the controlled price for cement set by the Price Control Council under Republic Act No. 6124. The petitioner alleged multiple grounds, including violations of procedural and substantive due process, as the price of P4.30 per bag was allegedly set and extended without a hearing and was confiscatory for being below production cost. It also contested the application of the new Price Control Law ( R.A. No. 6361 ), arguing its “rollback” provision did not apply to cement, whose controlled price had explicitly lapsed on June 30, 1971, and that the law’s composition was discriminatory for lacking producer representation.
The Court required respondents to answer. Subsequently, before the scheduled hearing, the petitioner filed a manifestation stating that the Price Control Council had set a new producer’s price of P4.75 per bag on February 23, 1972. The petitioner asserted this action radically changed the factual situation and removed the basis for its legal contention, as the petition primarily challenged the validity and enforceability of the old P4.30 price. Consequently, the petitioner manifested it was no longer interested in pursuing the petition and would seek remedies elsewhere.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for prohibition had become moot and academic due to supervening events.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The core legal logic rests on the doctrine of mootness. A case becomes moot and academic when there is no longer any justiciable controversy or when the issues presented have ceased to exist due to subsequent events, rendering a judicial declaration of no practical value. Here, the petitioner’s core challenge was directed at the validity and continued enforcement of the specific “maximum manufacturer’s price” of P4.30 per bag established under the old law. The Price Control Council’s issuance of a new and different controlled price of P4.75 per bag constituted a supervening event that fundamentally altered the factual landscape. The new order effectively superseded the very price control measure under attack. Since the relief sought—to prohibit the enforcement of the P4.30 price—was directed at an order that had been replaced, any ruling by the Court on its legality would be an abstract exercise without practical legal effect. The petitioner itself acknowledged this by manifesting it would pursue its grievances regarding the fairness of the new price through other administrative and legal avenues. Therefore, the Court granted the petitioner’s implied prayer and dismissed the case without prejudice to other remedies, making no pronouncement as to costs.