G.R. No. L-3366; April 27, 1951
Emerita Valdez, et al., petitioners, vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, et al., respondents.

FACTS

In Special Proceeding No. 253, “Intestate Estate of the Deceased Juan Valdez,” petitioners Emerita Valdez and Leodegario de la Fuente, through Attorney Juan S. Rustia, submitted a record on appeal on June 17, 1949, without a notice setting a date for hearing. The clerk of court set it for hearing on June 29, 1949, and the court approved the record on June 30, 1949. On July 6, 1949, Attorney Marcelo E. Pineda, for administratrix Magdalena Mendoza, moved to revoke the approval, arguing he received notice too late and that the approval violated the five-day rule under Section 7, Rule 41, and that ten specified pleadings were omitted. On July 15, 1949, the court cancelled its June 30 order and gave the administratrix ten days to oppose. The administratrix filed no opposition. On August 9, 1949, Atty. Rustia moved for approval, and on August 22, 1949, the court reinstated its June 30 order approving the record and directing its remission to the Supreme Court. On August 30, 1949, Atty. Pineda moved to revoke the August 22 order, claiming late receipt of the motion and that his July 6 pleading already stated his opposition. On September 21, 1949, the court revoked the August 22 order and required petitioners to submit an amended record including the pleadings specified in the July 6 objection. Petitioners contend that after approving the record, the court lost jurisdiction to issue such directives.

ISSUE

After approving the record on appeal, may the court of first instance compel the appellant to insert other pleadings at the appellee’s request?

RULING

No. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the New Rules of Court, upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the approval of the appeal bond and the record on appeal, the appeal is deemed perfected and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the parties’ rights which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, to approve compromises, and to permit withdrawal of the appeal. The court’s order of August 22, 1949, approving the record, perfected the appeal and deprived the court of jurisdiction. The appellee, having declined to take advantage of the period given to oppose after July 15, 1949, had no legitimate cause for another chance. The order of September 21, 1949, requiring inclusion of additional pleadings, is not covered by the court’s retained powers, as it involves matters litigated in the appeal and serves no useful purpose if the pleadings do not concern such matters. Therefore, the order is null and void. The petition is granted, with costs against administratrix Magdalena Mendoza.