G.R. No. L-32918-19, April 30, 1974
People of the Philippines vs. Felimon Manangan, et al., Ricardo Gloria, defendant-appellant, Attorney Amado S. Duran, respondent.

FACTS

This case involves a disciplinary proceeding against Atty. Amado S. Duran, counsel for appellant Ricardo Gloria. The Supreme Court, in a series of resolutions, required Atty. Duran to explain his failure to file the appellant’s brief, which was due on July 14, 1973. After he failed to respond to the Court’s show-cause orders, the Court imposed a fine and, upon his continued non-compliance, suspended him from the practice of law for six months via a resolution dated January 29, 1974.
Atty. Duran filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging two primary grounds. First, he argued that his client, Ricardo Gloria, had escaped from prison in December 1970, implying this event absolved him of his duty to file the brief. Second, he claimed he had not been receiving the Court’s notices because he had moved residences. Crucially, he attached a medical certificate showing he was hospitalized for a myocardial infarction from January 2 to 23, 1974, which prevented him from attending to his practice and from immediately learning about the suspension order.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its resolution suspending Atty. Amado S. Duran from the practice of law.

RULING

Yes, the Court granted partial reconsideration, modifying the suspension period. The Court found Atty. Duran’s initial grounds for reconsideration unmeritorious. His duty to file the brief remained intact as of its due date since the Court was only officially informed of the escape in August 1973, and as counsel, he was obligated to formally inform the Court of such a development. His claim of not receiving notices due to a change of address demonstrated negligence, as he had a duty to notify the Court of his new address to ensure proper service.
However, the Court, exercising its disciplinary power with compassion, found mitigating circumstances in his serious illness. His confinement for a heart attack during the critical period when the suspension order was issued provided a reasonable explanation for his inability to respond or comply promptly. The Court accepted that his failure was not due to intentional disrespect or defiance but to a grave health emergency. Consequently, while his conduct warranted discipline, the element of mercy was applied. The Court modified its earlier resolution by ordering that the six-month suspension would terminate as of May 1, 1974, effectively shortening its duration, and remitted the imposed fine.