GR L 3272; (November, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-3272-73 November 29, 1951
MANUEL GONZALES, petitioner-appellant, vs. MANOLITA GONZALES DE CARUNGCONG, petitioner-appellee; ALEJANDRO GONZALES, JR., and JUAN GONZALES, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS
Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales (testatrix) died on November 27, 1948. On December 22, 1948, her son Manuel Gonzales filed a petition for the probate of a will executed by the testatrix on November 16, 1942, which devised to him the greater portion of her estate. On December 31, 1948, her daughter Manolita G. de Carungcong filed a petition for the probate of a different will executed by the testatrix on May 5, 1945, which left the greater bulk of the estate to her. Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. opposed both wills, claiming they were revoked by an instrument executed by the testatrix on November 18, 1948, and that the estate should be distributed intestate. After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal held that the 1942 will was validly executed but was revoked by the 1945 will; that the 1948 revocation instrument was null and void; and that the 1945 will was the true last will and testament and admitted it to probate. Manuel Gonzales and Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. appealed.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) Whether the will executed on May 5, 1945, contained a valid attestation clause; and (2) Whether the instrument of November 18, 1948, validly revoked the 1945 will.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the attestation clause in the 1945 will, though forming part of the body of the will and phrased as a declaration by the testatrix, was valid. Following the precedent in Aldaba vs. Roque and the recent case of Cuevas vs. Achacoso, the Court held that the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses immediately under the testatrix’s signature showed they attested to the due execution of the will, substantially complying with legal requirements. The statement in the penultimate paragraph regarding the number of pages was sufficient and could be considered together with the last paragraph. Consequently, the 1945 will revoked the earlier 1942 will. Regarding the 1948 revocation instrument, the Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity at the time of its alleged execution, as she was in a comatose and unconscious state on November 18, 1948, due to hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. The circumstances surrounding the preparation and signing of the instrument also cast doubt on its validity. Therefore, the 1945 will was upheld as the last valid will.
