G.R. No. L-32596. April 15, 1988
INTEGRATED CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC. & ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION INC., petitioners, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and JUANA RAMORA VDA. DE CORPUZ, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a claim for death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act filed by respondent Juana Ramora Vda. de Corpuz following the death of her son, Orlando Corpuz, while employed by petitioners. The hearing officer initially dismissed the claim. On appeal, Associate Commissioner Paciano C. Villavieja of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission reversed the dismissal and awarded benefits in a decision dated July 23, 1970, which petitioners received on August 7, 1970.
On August 22, 1970, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Commission en banc. The Commission en banc, in an order dated September 11, 1970, denied this motion. It ruled that the motion was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 1, Rule 17 of its own Rules, thereby causing the Associate Commissioner’s decision to become final and depriving the Commission of jurisdiction to review it.

ISSUE

Whether the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration of an Associate Commissioner’s decision to the Commission en banc is governed by the fifteen-day period under Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the ten-day period under Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the ten-day period under the Commission’s Rules governs, thereby affirming the Commission en banc’s dismissal of the motion for reconsideration as filed out of time. The legal logic rests on the interpretation of the statutory framework and the Commission’s rule-making authority. The Court examined Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which provides a fifteen-day period for appealing an award of “the Commissioner.” Crucially, the Court, citing its precedent in Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, analyzed the legislative amendments to the Act. It found that Republic Act No. 4119 , which created a Commission composed of multiple members, systematically replaced the term “Commissioner” in the original Act with “Commission” in contexts referring to the en banc body. Therefore, the term “Commissioner” in Section 49 was interpreted to refer to the Commission en banc, not an individual Associate Commissioner.
Consequently, the fifteen-day period in Section 49 applies to appeals from a final decision of the Commission en banc to the courts. For intra-agency appeals from a single Commissioner to the Commission en banc, the period is governed by the Commission’s own rules, promulgated under the authority granted by Section 7-A of the Act. Section 1, Rule 17 of these Rules explicitly sets a ten-day period. Since petitioners received the Associate Commissioner’s decision on August 7, 1970, their motion filed on August 22, 1970, was five days late. The decision had thus become final and executory, and the Commission en banc correctly dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.