G.R. No. L-32532 March 29, 1974
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and QUIRICO DEL MAR, respondents.

FACTS

In 1951, Quirico del Mar obtained a loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), secured by a mortgage. In 1957, del Mar offered to settle the obligation using his backpay certificate under Republic Act 897, but RFC refused. Del Mar filed a mandamus suit (Civil Case R-5324) to compel acceptance. On May 22, 1958, the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered judgment ordering RFC to accept the certificate. RFC complied but discounted the certificate’s value. Del Mar challenged this discount in a separate case (R-6455), which ultimately reached the Supreme Court and was decided against him on August 8, 1967. In March 1967, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), as RFC’s successor, initiated foreclosure proceedings, claiming the backpay certificate proceeds were exhausted. Del Mar filed a new suit (R-9880) to stop the foreclosure. While that case was pending, on May 26, 1970, del Mar filed a motion in the original case (R-5324) for execution of the 1958 judgment. The respondent judge granted the motion, ordering execution, which prompted DBP to file this certiorari petition.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution of the 1958 judgment filed by del Mar on May 26, 1970.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the challenged orders, and made permanent the preliminary injunction. The core legal principle is the enforceability period for final judgments under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. A final judgment may be executed by motion within five years from its finality. After five years but before ten years, it can only be enforced by a separate civil action. The Court held the May 22, 1958 judgment in Civil Case R-5324 was definitive and final. It completely adjudicated the sole issue—whether RFC was obligated to accept the backpay certificate—and left nothing more for the court’s determination. The fact that the exact monetary value of the certificate, after discounting, was later settled in a separate case (L-22254) did not render the 1958 judgment incomplete or interlocutory. A judgment ordering a specific act (acceptance of the certificate) is final for execution purposes. The five-year period for execution by motion began from the finality of the 1958 judgment, not from the 1967 Supreme Court decision that merely resolved a collateral issue on the discount rate. Del Mar’s motion filed in 1970 was over twelve years late, thus clearly barred. The respondent judge’s order directing execution was a ministerial act based on a misapprehension of the judgment’s finality and the applicable reglementary period, constituting grave abuse of discretion.