GR L 31974; (July, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-31974; July 31, 1987
NICOLAS LEYTE and MARCELO LEYTE, defendants-petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, First Branch, Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, Respondents, and BENIGNO I. CARIAGA, SR., plaintiff-respondent.
FACTS
The petitioners, Nicolas and Marcelo Leyte, were sued for recovery of possession of land. They failed to answer the complaint and were consequently declared in default. The case proceeded ex parte, resulting in a judgment against them on February 23, 1970. The petitioners learned of this default judgment on March 21, 1970.
On April 2, 1970, the petitioners filed a verified motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, alleging mistake and excusable negligence and supported by affidavits of merit showing a valid defense. The respondent judge denied this motion, ruling it was an improper remedy. Subsequent pleas for time to file a motion to lift the order of default were also denied. The petitioners thus elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ motion for new trial as an improper remedy.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court held that the respondent judge erred in dismissing the motion for new trial. The legal logic is clear: a motion to set aside an order of default under Rule 18, Section 3, must be filed before a judgment by default is rendered. Here, the judgment had already been rendered when the petitioners discovered the default, but it was not yet final and executory. Therefore, the appropriate remedy was precisely a motion for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1(a), on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
The petitioners’ motion complied with all requisites: it was verified, filed within the reglementary period (12 days from learning of the judgment), alleged specific grounds, and was supported by affidavits of merit. The Supreme Court emphasized the policy of liberality in setting aside defaults, reiterating that default judgments are disfavored as they deny due process. Courts must provide every reasonable opportunity for parties to present their defenses, and procedural lapses that do not impair justice should not be strictly enforced. The order denying the motion for new trial was set aside, and the respondent judge was directed to resolve it after a proper hearing.