G.R. Nos. L-31788 and L-31792, September 15, 1975
ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, petitioner, vs. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS, as Judge of Pasig Branch I, Rizal Court of First Instance; Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, and ELISEO C. DE GUZMAN, as Assistant Fiscal of Rizal, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from criminal charges related to alleged “land-grabbing” in Rizal, where Torrens titles were amended to vastly increase land areas, purportedly encompassing public domain. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas, the former Commissioner of Land Registration, was initially investigated by the Provincial Fiscal’s office. Following these investigations, several criminal cases for estafa through falsification of public documents were filed. In multiple cases, Noblejas was listed and testified as a prosecution witness. Notably, on September 2, 1968, then Investigating Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of Justice recommending that Noblejas be “dropped as one of the respondents” in the land-grabbing cases, a recommendation which the Secretary of Justice approved.
Subsequently, however, respondent fiscals amended the information in Criminal Case No. 19574 (People vs. Genoveva Carlos, et al.) to include Noblejas as a co-accused. Noblejas filed a motion to quash the amended information on several grounds, including lack of preliminary investigation and estoppel due to his prior exoneration approved by the Secretary of Justice. The respondent judge denied the motion to quash. Noblejas then filed these consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to nullify the orders denying his motion and to enjoin the fiscals from prosecuting him in the related cases.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent fiscals had the legal authority to include petitioner Noblejas as an accused in the amended information, given the prior approval by the Secretary of Justice of the fiscal’s recommendation to drop him from the cases.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petitions. The Court ruled that the respondent fiscals acted without authority in including Noblejas as an accused. The legal logic centers on the power of control and supervision vested in the Secretary of Justice over prosecuting officers under the Administrative Code. The Court emphasized that once the Secretary of Justice, exercising his constitutional power of control as the President’s alter ego, approved Fiscal Aquino’s memorandum recommending Noblejas’s exoneration, that decision was binding on the fiscals. The fiscals could not unilaterally reverse this decision by subsequently including Noblejas in an amended information without first securing a reversal or modification from the Secretary himself.
The Court rejected the fiscals’ argument that Department of Justice Circular No. 97, which requires prior authority to prosecute certain public officials, was inapplicable because Noblejas had already resigned. The Court held that the Secretary’s approval of the exoneration was an exercise of his broader power of supervision and control, not merely a procedural requirement under the circular. Consequently, the amended information insofar as it implicated Noblejas was unauthorized. The orders denying the motion to quash were set aside, and the fiscals were permanently enjoined from including Noblejas as an accused in the specified case and from taking any criminal action against him concerning the land-grabbing matters covered by the Secretary’s approval.