G.R. No. L-31683. January 31, 1983.
ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Civil Service Commissioner, HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO, as Mayor of Quezon City, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman, a civil service eligible, was appointed as a patrolman in the Quezon City Police Department in 1965. He completed the required police training. His appointment papers were forwarded to the Civil Service Commissioner in March 1966. Over a year later, in May 1967, the Commissioner returned the appointment papers without action, declaring de Guzman disqualified under the Police Act of 1966 ( Republic Act No. 4864 ), which required that an appointee “must have no criminal record.” This finding was based solely on de Guzman’s affirmative answer in his Civil Service Information Sheet, where he disclosed two prior violations: a jaywalking ordinance (fine of P5.50) and a Manila ordinance for a cochero occupying a seat not reserved for him (fine of P5.00). Consequently, his salary payments were stopped. De Guzman filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, but the Court of First Instance dismissed it, ruling that “no criminal record” encompassed violations of municipal ordinances without distinction.

ISSUE

Whether violations of municipal ordinances for jaywalking and for a cochero occupying an improper seat constitute a “criminal record” that disqualifies a person from appointment to the police force under the Police Act of 1966.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the disclosed ordinance violations do not constitute a disqualifying “criminal record.” The Court explained that the legislative intent behind the “no criminal record” qualification in the Police Act could not have been to automatically and perpetually disqualify individuals for minor regulatory infractions carrying nominal fines. The Court recognized a distinction in law between crimes defined by national statutes, which involve moral turpitude or public wrongs, and violations of municipal ordinances, which are often local regulatory measures for community order, health, and safety. For a municipal ordinance violation to qualify as a “crime” for disqualification purposes, it must involve a degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or a want of principle reasonably related to the office’s requirements. The petitioner’s minor, non-moral infractions did not meet this standard. Furthermore, the Court held that the Civil Service Commissioner’s inaction on the appointment papers beyond the 180-day reglementary period resulted in the approval of the appointment by operation of law. Thus, the subsequent termination of de Guzman’s services was an illegal removal. The Court ordered his reinstatement, provided he met current qualifications, and the payment of back salaries and five years of backpay.