G.R. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, Eufemio S. Eufemio, in 1953, alleging abandonment and adultery. She prayed for a decree of separation and the deprivation of her husband’s share in the conjugal partnership. In his answer, Eufemio raised affirmative defenses and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of his alleged prior subsisting marriage to another woman. Trial proceeded, but before its completion, Carmen died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969.
Upon notification of her death, Eufemio moved to dismiss the legal separation petition, arguing the action abated upon Carmen’s death. Carmen’s counsel moved to substitute her with her father, Macario Lapuz, to continue the action. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss and did not act on the motion for substitution. It held that the cause of action did not survive the plaintiff’s death. The court’s order dismissed the entire case, including Eufemio’s counterclaim for annulment, which he did not oppose.

ISSUE

The principal issue is whether the death of the plaintiff spouse during the pendency of an action for legal separation abates the action, including any related property claims.

RULING

Yes, the death of a party abates the action for legal separation. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. An action for legal separation is purely personal in character. Article 100 of the Civil Code allows only the innocent spouse to claim it, and Article 108 allows the spouses to abate proceedings through reconciliation. The personal nature of the action means it dies with the person—actio personalis moritur cum persona. Death produces a more radical and definitive separation than any judicial decree, rendering the action moot. The Court rejected the argument that the inclusion of property rights in the petition alters this principle. Property rights in a legal separation case are mere effects or consequences of the decree. Their source is the decree itself; without a final decree, they remain mere expectant rights. Since death precludes the issuance of a final decree, these consequential rights never come into existence.
Regarding the counterclaim for annulment, the Court found it became moot upon Carmen’s death, which automatically dissolved the marital union. Any property rights arising from their cohabitation could be resolved in a proper partition action. The Court further noted that even if the marriage were merely voidable, an action for annulment is extinguished upon the death of a party under Article 87 of the Civil Code. Liquidation of any conjugal partnership should occur in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, not in the annulment case. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the entire case.