G.R. No. L-3080

FACTS:
In August 1901, Narciso Cabantag, a civilian, was tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death by a military commission. His conviction was confirmed in December 1901. He escaped but later surrendered in July 1902. Subsequently, acting on Cabantag’s petition for pardon, the Civil Governor commuted his sentence to twenty years’ imprisonment, which was approved by the Secretary of War by direction of the President of the United States. Cabantag, having been confined under the commuted sentence, filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking his release.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the military commission had jurisdiction to try and convict Cabantag.
2. Whether the executive had the authority to commute his sentence.
3. Whether the commutation was valid and effective.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and ordered Cabantag remanded to custody.

1. On Jurisdiction: The military commission was properly constituted under General Orders issued during the period of military occupation and had jurisdiction over the crime of murder. Its sentences remained valid. Although such commissions ceased to exist after the proclamation of July 4, 1902, Act No. 865 (enacted September 3, 1903) authorized civil courts (Courts of First Instance) to carry out unexecuted sentences of military commissions, thereby providing a legal basis for enforcement.

2. On Executive Authority: The pardoning power, including the power to commute sentences, was validly exercised. The Civil Governor acted under delegated authority from the President of the United States. The commutation in this case was reported to and approved by the President through the Secretary of War, constituting direct presidential action.

3. On Validity of Commutation: The commutation was a valid reduction of penalty, not a conditional pardon requiring acceptance. In any event, by petitioning for pardon, Cabantag manifested acceptance of any executive clemency, including commutation. Furthermore, his offense was a crime against civil law, not purely a violation of the laws of war, placing it within the scope of the Civil Governor’s commutation authority under the relevant instructions.

Even if the commutation were invalid, Cabantag would remain subject to his original sentence, which the Court of First Instance was empowered to execute under Act No. 865 .