GR L 30491; (January, 1972) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30491 January 21, 1972
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE CAÑETE, PASTOR ESTOROSOS, ANATALIO COCA, and ROSMAR INTONG, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
The defendants-appellants, together with two others initially charged, were accused of the multiple rape of Presida Alvarado. The information alleged that on February 15, 1968, in Calamba, Misamis Occidental, the accused, conspiring and helping one another, deceived the victim by pretending to be policemen. They led her to an isolated area where, through force, intimidation with a knife, and abuse of superior strength, they successively had carnal knowledge of her against her will. Each accused physically assisted the others by holding down the victim’s limbs and covering her mouth during the assaults.
During trial, the prosecution moved for the discharge of two co-accused, Alejandro Apdujan and Tomas Alburo, to utilize the former as a state witness and due to insufficient evidence against the latter, which the court granted over the defense’s objection. The trial court convicted the remaining four appellants—Jose Cañete, Pastor Estorosos, Anatalio Coca, and Rosmar Intong—of multiple rape and sentenced them to death. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly convicted each of the appellants for multiple counts of rape and properly imposed the penalty of death for each count.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty and civil liability. The Court found the evidence, primarily the credible and consistent testimony of the victim, sufficient to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. The acts of the appellants, executed through a clear conspiracy, demonstrated common design and mutual assistance in the commission of the rape.
The legal logic hinges on the doctrine of conspiracy and the nature of liability in collective criminal acts. The Court ruled that where several persons conspire to commit rape and, in pursuance of that conspiracy, each actively participates by alternately having carnal knowledge of the victim and physically assisting the others during their turns, each conspirator is liable not only for the rape he personally committed but also as a principal by cooperation for the rapes perpetrated by his co-conspirators. Consequently, each appellant is guilty of five counts of rape—one for his own act and four for the acts of his co-accused which he aided.
Regarding penalty, the crime was qualified by the use of a deadly weapon and committed by more than three persons, warranting the imposition of death under the Revised Penal Code. The presence of aggravating circumstances, including abuse of superior strength and ignominy, justified the imposition of the supreme penalty. The Court thus modified the trial court’s decision, sentencing each appellant to death for each of the five counts of rape and increasing the civil indemnity for each offense. The judgment was affirmed with modifications.
