GR L 30391; (November, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30391 November 25, 1982
Associated Sugar, Inc., Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., MAAO Sugar Central Co., Inc., and Financing Corporation of the Philippines, petitioners-appellants, vs. Commissioner of Customs and Court of Tax Appeals, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
The petitioners, sugar companies, exported raw sugar to the United States between 1959 and 1966. The shipments were loaded onto ocean-going vessels at two privately owned wharves in Negros Occidental, specifically the Sto. Nino Wharf in Bacolod City and the wharf of the Philippine Bulk Corporation in Pulupandan. No government port facilities were utilized during these loading operations.
The Collector of Customs for the Port of Iloilo levied and collected wharfage dues totaling P904,236.38 on these shipments under Sections 2801 and 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The petitioners paid under protest. After the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs upheld the assessment, the petitioners appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which dismissed their petition for review. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether wharfage dues are legally collectible on export cargoes loaded exclusively at private wharves without the use of any government port facilities.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling that the collection was legal. The Court clarified that under the Tariff and Customs Code, the term “wharfage” is a statutory misnomer and does not denote a charge merely for the use of a wharf. Sections 2801 and 2802 define wharfage dues as a charge assessed against the cargo itself based on its quantity, weight, or measure, irrespective of whether a wharf, public or private, is used, or even if loading occurs offshore. The law explicitly provides for reduced rates when private wharves are used, confirming its applicability.
The legal logic is that wharfage dues, as redefined by statute, function as a tax or charge to support the customs service and the maintenance of port safety and security, from which all cargoes benefit. This concept, established in prior jurisprudence like Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs, abandons the common law notion of wharfage as rent for wharf use. Therefore, the petitioners’ non-use of government facilities is immaterial to their liability. The assessment is a valid exercise of the state’s taxing power and does not constitute a deprivation of property without due process.