GR L 30309; (November, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983
CLEMENTE BRIÑAS, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Clemente Briñas, a conductor for the Manila Railroad Company, was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence. The information alleged that on January 6, 1957, Briñas and other train personnel operated a passenger train in a negligent manner by failing to provide adequate lighting and safety precautions. While the train was passing through Tiaong, Quezon, two passengers, Martina Bool and her three-year-old granddaughter Emelita Gesmundo, fell from the moving coach and were run over, causing their instantaneous deaths. The trial court found Briñas guilty, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the criminal case, the heirs of the deceased filed a separate civil action for damages (Civil Case No. 5978) solely against the Manila Railroad Company. Briñas appealed his conviction, arguing, among other points, that the trial court erred in awarding civil indemnity in the criminal judgment since a separate civil action had already been instituted. He contended that the source of obligation in the civil case was culpa contractual, distinct from the criminal culpa, and that the prosecution presented no evidence on damages.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or erred in awarding civil indemnity for death in its criminal judgment despite the heirs having filed a separate civil action for damages against the railroad company.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the civil indemnity awards. It held that the trial court correctly awarded death indemnity in the criminal case. The Court clarified that the civil liability ex delicto arising from the crime is distinct from any independent civil action that may arise from other sources of obligation, such as contract or quasi-delict. The filing of a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, presumably based on culpa contractual, did not extinguish or preclude the civil liability arising from the crime itself against the convicted accused.
The death indemnity awarded in a criminal case is a civil liability that is a direct consequence of the criminal act and is recoverable in the criminal proceeding. This indemnity for the fact of death is fixed by law and is separate from other forms of damages like loss of earning capacity or moral damages, which require proof. The absence of interrogation on damages during the criminal trial was immaterial for the award of the standard death indemnity, as it is recoverable as a matter of law upon proof of the fact of death resulting from the crime. The Court increased the indemnity to P12,000 for each victim, conforming to the prevailing standard, and deleted the subsidiary imprisonment clause. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.
