GR L 30272; (February, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30272 February 28, 1985
RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., petitioner, vs. CONSUELO C. VILLAREAL, ISABEL C. VILLAREAL, FLAVIANO C. VILLAREAL, ALFREDO V. GOMEZ, AURORA V. GOMEZ and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents, the Villareals and Gomezes, filed an application for registration of two agricultural lots in Binangonan, Rizal. They claimed ownership by purchase from Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo in 1955, asserting that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and open possession since time immemorial. They further alleged the lots were unoccupied and that they had been paying real estate taxes thereon.
Petitioner Rizal Cement Co., Inc. opposed the application, asserting ownership over three unregistered parcels of land covered by Plan Psu-2260 approved in 1912. It claimed that the lots applied for by the respondents were actually portions of its Lots 1 and 4 of that plan. The petitioner contended it was in possession and had been paying real estate taxes for the property. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the petitioner, denying the application and ordering the issuance of a decree in the petitioner’s name. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court and in finding that the private respondents had sufficiently established their ownership over the subject lots, thereby entitling them to registration.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court held that its jurisdiction in cases appealed from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, as the appellate court’s findings of fact are conclusive unless they fall under specific exceptions, such as being grounded on speculation or being manifestly absurd. None of these exceptions were present in this case.
The Court of Appeals’ factual findings, supported by substantial evidence, were binding. It correctly ruled that the petitioner’s evidence, primarily its reliance on Plan Psu-2260, was insufficient to establish ownership. A survey plan merely delimits an area and its approval by the Director of Lands does not constitute an adjudication of title; it only certifies that the survey was conducted according to regulations. The petitioner failed to present conclusive evidence of ownership over the specific portions claimed by the respondents. Conversely, the appellate court found that the private respondents had presented a preponderance of evidence to substantiate their claim of ownership through a chain of title and possession. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the conclusion that the respondents had satisfactorily proven their registrable title.