G.R. No. L-29887 October 28, 1974
TRIMICA, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION and the HON. DELFIN B. FLORES in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XI, and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, respondents.

FACTS

Polaris Marketing Corporation sued the House of Fine Furnitures, Inc. in the Makati Municipal Court to recover the price of foam products. Fine Furnitures, represented by its counsel Francisco Capistrano, Jr., denied the purchase. After a default judgment against it, Fine Furnitures appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). During the trial de novo, Polaris presented its evidence. Fine Furnitures then presented Capistrano and Constantino B. Torre, Trimica Inc.’s storekeeper. Torre testified the foam products were actually received and used by Trimica, Inc. Capistrano, who was both secretary of Fine Furnitures and president of Trimica, Inc., testified that to circumvent Polaris’s credit limit, Trimica’s production manager arranged to purchase materials on credit using Fine Furnitures’ name.
Based on this testimony, the CFI judge ordered Polaris to amend its complaint to implead Trimica, Inc. as a defendant, alleging solidary liability. The amended complaint was admitted. Without any summons being served on Trimica, Inc., the CFI rendered a decision absolving Fine Furnitures and ordering Trimica, Inc. to pay Polaris. After the judgment became final, Trimica, Inc., through a new lawyer, moved to set aside the judgment, arguing it was void for lack of summons and due process. The CFI denied the motion, reasoning Trimica had its day in court through Capistrano’s presence and admissions.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction over Trimica, Inc. and rendered a valid judgment against it despite the absence of service of summons.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled the judgment against Trimica, Inc. was void for lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process. Jurisdiction over a corporation is acquired either by valid service of summons or its voluntary appearance. Here, Trimica, Inc. was never summoned. The appearance of its president, Capistrano, was solely in his capacity as counsel for the co-defendant Fine Furnitures, not as a representative of Trimica, Inc. This cannot be construed as a voluntary submission by the corporation to the court’s jurisdiction. The court’s duty, upon admitting the amended complaint that introduced a new party, was to order service of summons on that new party to afford it an opportunity to be heard.
The fundamental requirements of due process—notice and hearing—are indispensable and cannot be dispensed with on grounds of expediency or the court’s awareness of a party’s potential liability through its officer’s testimony in a different capacity. Procedural rules ensuring these rights are not mere technicalities but essential to orderly justice. While the rule against changing the cause of action on appeal generally applies, the peculiar facts, where Capistrano’s own testimony justified the amendment, made its strict application unjust. The case was remanded to the lower court with instructions to duly summon Trimica, Inc. and allow it to present its defense.