G.R. No. L-29736 October 31, 1974
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (PVTA), petitioner, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV), and ABRA AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, INC., (Bangued, Abra), respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner PVTA received notice of the trial court’s judgment on June 22, 1968. On July 19, 1968, within the 30-day reglementary period, it filed its notice of appeal and appeal bond. Simultaneously, it filed a motion for a 15-day extension to file its record on appeal. The trial court did not act on this motion. PVTA did not verify the status of its motion and allowed the original 30-day period to lapse on July 22, 1968. On July 31, 1968, nine days after the expiry, PVTA filed a second motion for extension, seeking to suspend the period until a co-defendant’s motion for reconsideration was resolved. Private respondent opposed, arguing the appeal was dilatory.
The trial court, in an order dated October 16, 1968, dismissed PVTA’s appeal for failure to file the record on appeal on time. It noted the Government Corporate Counsel’s own prior opinion that an appeal would likely not prosper. PVTA filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the dismissal order and compel the court to give due course to its appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing PVTA’s appeal for failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of appeal periods. The filing of a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal does not suspend the running of the original reglementary period. A movant has no right to assume the motion will be granted; it is incumbent upon the movant to verify the court’s action. If the motion is not acted upon and the period lapses without the record on appeal being filed, the right to appeal is lost.
Here, PVTA’s first motion for extension was never granted. Its inaction after filing that motion, without checking for a ruling, led to the expiration of the appeal period on July 22, 1968. Its second motion, filed after this expiration, was therefore late. The Court clarified that while a subsequent approval of a record on appeal can imply a granted extension (as in Berkenkotter), a subsequent dismissal of the appeal constitutes a denial of the extension. The trial court’s dismissal order effectively denied PVTA’s motions. Given the mandatory character of appeal periods under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, essential for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business, and the absence of a showing that the denial was capricious or arbitrary, no grave abuse of discretion attended the respondent judge’s order. The judgment had thus become final and executory.