G.R. No. L-28899 May 30, 1974
ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, a member of the Philippine Bar, was required by respondent Judge Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. via a letter dated December 5, 1967, to explain within 72 hours why he should not be disciplined for allegedly preparing a verified petition in a miscellaneous case containing false averments that an owner’s duplicate certificate of title was lost. The petition, which led to a court order for the issuance of a new duplicate title, allegedly contained statements known by petitioner to be false, as the title was in the custody of a municipal judge. Petitioner denied the allegations and explained the circumstances in his reply.
Dissatisfied, respondent Judge docketed the matter as Administrative Case No. 59, set it for hearing, and denied petitioner’s oral motion for inhibition, arguing the judge acted as both prosecutor and judge. Respondent Judge proceeded to hear evidence, prompting petitioner to file the instant prohibition case. Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over disbarment proceedings and that, assuming courts of first instance have authority, the procedure under Rule 139 must be followed.

ISSUE

Whether a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to initiate and hear, motu proprio, an administrative case for the suspension of a member of the bar.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance possesses the jurisdiction to do so. The power to discipline attorneys, stemming from the Supreme Court’s inherent authority to regulate the practice of law, is also statutorily accorded to lower courts. Rule 138, Sections 28 to 30 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provide that a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for causes enumerated in the preceding section (such as deceit or malpractice). The procedure outlined is that upon such suspension, the court must transmit the records to the Supreme Court for full investigation and final action. These provisions affirm the lower court’s jurisdiction to conduct preliminary proceedings, including hearing the case on its own motion.
The Court emphasized that an attorney is an officer of the court, continually accountable for his conduct. The lower court’s duty to control the conduct of its officers is not only a power but an obligation when misconduct is apparent. Jurisprudence supports the inherent power of courts of general jurisdiction to initiate disbarment proceedings sua sponte to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. The respondent Judge, therefore, acted within his jurisdiction in initiating and hearing Administrative Case No. 59. The writ of prohibition was denied and the preliminary injunction dissolved.