G.R. No. L-28529. April 30, 1979.
L. P. LEVISTE & COMPANY, INC., and NITA U. BERTHELSEN, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS in his capacity as Land Registration Commissioner, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, and MARIA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

FACTS

The property, a subdivision lot owned by Z. Garcia Realty, Inc., is the subject of conflicting claims. Respondent Maria Villanueva registered an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on May 6, 1966, based on an agreement to sell executed by Garcia Realty. Subsequently, petitioners Nita U. Berthelsen and L.P. Leviste & Co. caused annotations of writs of attachment on the title on July 19 and 25, 1966, respectively, covering the entire property including the lot claimed by Villanueva. A prior notice of lis pendens and another adverse claim were also annotated but pertained to different lots. When Garcia Realty and Villanueva consummated a sale on May 29, 1967, Villanueva sought issuance of a new title free from all encumbrances. The Register of Deeds refused, ruling the subsequent attachments must be carried over. The Land Registration Commission, on consulta, reversed the Register of Deeds. It ruled Villanueva’s adverse claim took priority over subsequent encumbrances and, since the prior annotations referred to other lots, her title should be issued free of all liens.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Villanueva’s registered adverse claim, based on an unregistered agreement to sell, prevails over the subsequently registered writs of attachment levied by petitioners on the same property.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s resolution. The legal logic centers on the proper remedy for registering a vendee’s interest under an executory contract. An adverse claim under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act ( Act No. 496 ) is a provisional remedy available only when the ordinary method of registering an instrument—presenting the deed and the owner’s duplicate certificate of title under Section 57—is not possible. The Court held that an agreement to sell, creating a personal right to demand conveyance, is registrable under Section 57. Since there was no showing that Villanueva attempted but was unable to register the agreement itself due to the owner’s refusal to surrender the duplicate certificate, her resort to a mere adverse claim was improper and ineffective. Consequently, the adverse claim did not operate as a conveyance of a real right and could not prejudice subsequent attachments registered by third parties. The attachments, being subsequent in time but levied upon a right not validly protected by the prior annotation, gained superiority. Therefore, the new title to be issued to Villanueva must carry over the annotations of the petitioners’ writs of attachment.