GR L 28363; (May, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-28363. May 15, 1974.
NIEVES PALMA GIL VILLARICA and ANGEL VILLARICA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION PALMA GIL and ILUMINADA U. PACETES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Nieves Palma Gil Villarica and Angel Villarica appealed from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Court of Appeals dismissed their appeal, finding that the printed record on appeal failed to show on its face that the appeal was perfected on time as required by Section 1(a), Rule 50 in relation to Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. The printed record on appeal did not indicate its filing date, though the original typewritten version was stamped as submitted on March 20, 1964.
The petitioners had received a copy of the trial court’s February 17, 1964 order on February 18, 1964. They filed a motion for reconsideration on February 21, 1964, which was denied by an order dated February 29, 1964, received by them on March 3, 1964. They then filed a notice of appeal on March 4, 1964, and subsequently submitted their record on appeal on March 20, 1964.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners’ appeal for failure to perfect it within the reglementary period.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling that the appeal was not perfected on time. While the printed record on appeal’s omission of the filing date was not fatal per se—as established in Design Masters, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, where the date stamped on the original record suffices for substantial compliance—the critical issue was the timeliness of the appeal’s perfection.
Under Section 3, Rule 41, an appeal must be perfected within thirty (30) days from notice of the order or judgment. The period to appeal from the February 17, 1964 order commenced on February 18, 1964, making the last day to perfect the appeal March 19, 1964. The petitioners filed their record on appeal only on March 20, 1964, which was one day late. Their motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the appeal period because it was a pro forma motion. The motion merely alleged that the order was “contrary to law” and “contrary to the facts” without specifying any legal or factual basis, thereby failing to comply with the substantive requirements of Rule 37. Consequently, the appeal was time-barred. The Supreme Court, having examined the substantive merits, also found the trial court’s orders to be just, but the dismissal rested squarely on the procedural lapse of missing the appeal deadline.