G.R. No. L-27923 November 18, 1991
MARCELA N. GONZALES, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, City Judge of Davao City (Branch III), ALFREDO M. CELI, First Assistant City Fiscal of Davao City, representing the People of the Philippines, and FILIPINAS ORDOÑEZ, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

An Information for slander was filed by Assistant City Fiscal Alfredo Celi against Marcela Gonzales before the City Court of Davao. The Information alleged that Gonzales publicly uttered defamatory words against Filipinas Ordoñez, including “mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa” (seducer of wives of other husbands or adulteress), “tibihon,” “putang ina mo,” “walang hiya,” and “patay gutom.” Gonzales moved to quash the Information, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the fiscal had no authority to file it. She contended that the phrase “mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa” imputed the crime of adultery, a private offense requiring a complaint by the offended party, which was not filed. The motion was denied by respondent Judge, leading Gonzales to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance (CFI).
The CFI granted the petition, permanently enjoining the criminal proceedings. It ruled that the entire defamatory utterance must be read as a whole, with the primary imputation being adultery. The subsequent phrases were deemed merely explanatory or emphatic, intended to give “spicy flavor” to the main accusation of adultery. Since adultery cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the fiscal’s Information was void, and the court acquired no jurisdiction. The respondents appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the City Fiscal had the authority to file the Information for slander, or whether the case required a complaint by the offended party because the defamatory words imputed a private crime.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the CFI decision and reinstated the City Court’s order denying the motion to quash. The Court held that the fiscal had the authority to file the Information, and the case could proceed.
The legal logic centers on the interpretation of the defamatory statements. The Court disagreed with the CFI’s view that all phrases constituted a single imputation of adultery. It emphasized that each defamatory remark within a slanderous utterance must be considered separately to determine what crime, vice, or defect is imputed. The phrase “mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa” does impute adultery, a private crime. However, the other phrases—such as “putang ina mo” (your mother is a prostitute), “walang hiya” (shameless), and “patay gutom” (glutton)—impute a vice, defect, or condition not constituting a public crime. Slander that imputes a vice or defect is a public crime that can be prosecuted de oficio by a fiscal.
Consequently, the slanderous utterance comprised multiple, distinct imputations. Since at least one of these imputations (the vice or defect) is a public offense, the City Fiscal was authorized to initiate the prosecution by filing the Information. The case of People vs. Yu was distinguished, as it involved a complex crime scenario under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which was not applicable here. The City Court therefore had jurisdiction to try the case.