G.R. No. L-27730. January 21, 1974.
Prima Malipol, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Lily Lim Tan and Ernesto Labsan, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan was struck and killed by a gasoline tanker owned by Lily Lim Tan and driven by Ernesto Labsan in Batangas. The victim’s mother and minor siblings, the appellees, filed a complaint for damages on May 18, 1966. Summons was served on the appellants on May 19, 1966. They failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. Upon appellees’ motion, the trial court declared appellants in default on June 10, 1966, allowed ex parte presentation of evidence, and rendered a judgment by default on July 1, 1966, ordering Labsan to pay various damages, with Lim Tan being held subsidiarily liable. Appellants received a copy of the decision on August 23, 1966.
On September 21, 1966, appellants filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and for a new trial. They alleged excusable negligence, stating that appellant Lim Tan had promptly referred the summons to her lawyer, Atty. Daniel Chavez, who, due to an abnormal mental condition, mistakenly informed a subsequent lawyer, Atty. Romulo de Castro, that the summons was received on May 30, 1966, not May 19. This led to the late filing of an answer on June 20, 1966. Appellants argued they had meritorious defenses, including force majeure and due diligence. The trial court denied the motion on October 10, 1966, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying the appellants’ motion to lift the order of default and for a new trial based on the claim of excusable negligence.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial. The legal logic centers on the requirements for setting aside a default order under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. A party must show that the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and must allege under oath a meritorious defense. The Court found appellants’ claim of excusable negligence unsubstantiated. Appellant Lim Tan received the summons on May 19 but only referred it to her lawyer on May 30, the eleventh day, demonstrating a lack of due diligence. The alleged mistake of Atty. Chavez, who committed suicide days later, was deemed a product of this initial negligence, not an independent excusable event. The subsequent lawyer’s reliance on the wrong date did not cure the initial delay.
Furthermore, the Court found the affidavit of merit accompanying the motion insufficient. It failed to allege facts constituting a valid defense with particularity. General claims of force majeure and due diligence, without specific supporting facts, are inadequate to warrant a new trial. The purpose of a motion for new trial is to prevent an injustice, not to grant a rehearing where the result would likely be the same. The trial court’s discretion in denying the motion was thus upheld, as appellants did not satisfactorily prove excusable negligence or a prima facie meritorious defense.