G.R. No. L-27611, L-27612, L-27613, August 30, 1972
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Jose Sierra, Jr., Bienvenido G. Garra, Lucio M. Cayaba, Enrique Javier, Carlos Carluen, and Hartman Montero, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Three separate informations for alleged violations of the Tariff and Customs Code were filed by State Prosecutor Delia P. Medina against the defendants-appellees. The defendants filed motions to quash, challenging the authority of the state prosecutor to file the informations and alleging a denial of their right to a preliminary investigation. The lower court granted the motions and dismissed the cases.
In its order, the lower court acknowledged the power of a state prosecutor, designated by the Secretary of Justice to assist a city fiscal, to file an information and prosecute independently. However, it held that during the preliminary investigation stage, the state prosecutor must be subordinate to the city fiscal. The court ruled that the investigations here were invalid because they were not initiated by complaints docketed with and assigned by the City Fiscal’s office. It further found a denial of due process, stating the records did not show the accused were properly heard as respondents in a preliminary investigation.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in quashing the informations on the grounds of the state prosecutor’s lack of authority and a denial of the right to preliminary investigation.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal. On the first issue, the Court reiterated established doctrine that a special prosecutor appointed by the Secretary of Justice under the Revised Administrative Code possesses full authority to investigate and prosecute cases independently, without need for prior consent, control, or assignment from the local fiscal. The lower court’s attempt to bifurcate the process—making the prosecutor subordinate during investigation but independent during prosecution—contradicted controlling precedents like People v. Henderson and Dinglasan v. Guerrero, which affirm the prosecutor’s plenary and autonomous authority from inception.
On the second issue, the Court found no due process violation. A preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right essential to due process; it is merely a statutory grant. Its absence does not impair the court’s jurisdiction or the validity of the information. The right is waived if not invoked before plea, as held in People v. Figueroa. The accused’s remedy, if they believed the investigation was irregular, was to demand one before trial, not a motion to quash. The informations, filed by a duly authorized officer, were valid on their face. Therefore, the lower court committed reversible error in dismissing the cases.