G.R. No. L-27084 July 31, 1968
ANGELA ESTATE, INC., and FERNANDO F. GONZAGA, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., and THE BACOLOD-MURCIA SUGAR FARMERS CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Angela Estate, Inc. and Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. (Landowners) own Hacienda Helvetia. Respondent Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. (Central) operates a sugar mill and entered into identical printed amended milling contracts in 1936 with the Landowners’ predecessors-in-interest. These contracts, which superseded earlier 1920 contracts, obligated the Central to construct and maintain railroad lines for transporting sugar cane. In return, the Landowners granted the Central a right of way on their lands for the construction of these railways, expressly stating that such easements would last “por un periodo de cuarenta y cinco años o cosechas, a contar desde la cosecha de 1920-1921.” The Central built railroad tracks traversing Hacienda Helvetia. Upon the expiration of the 1936 contracts at the end of the 1964-1965 crop year, the Landowners demanded the removal of the railway tracks and threatened to deny passage. The Central filed a complaint (CC 7697) in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the removal and for the award of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 of the Civil Code, arguing its use was indispensable. The Bacolod-Murcia Sugar Farmers Corporation (Planters) intervened as complainant. The respondent court issued the writ of preliminary injunction on October 4, 1965, and maintained it in subsequent orders. The Landowners then filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing and maintaining the writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, annulled and set aside the respondent court’s orders, and made permanent its own preliminary injunction. The Court held that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion. The milling contracts, which created a voluntary easement, had expressly expired. The Central’s claim to a legal easement under Article 649 of the Civil Code was not clear and indubitable, as the requisites for such an easement—particularly the lack of adequate outlet and the selection of the least prejudicial passage—had not been properly averred or proved. The Central’s claim was further weakened by its contractual waiver, as it had stipulated for a temporary, contract-bound easement. The preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should only issue if the right is clear and unmistakable, which was not the case. Therefore, the writ was issued without legal basis.