GR L 27005; (January, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-27005; January 31, 1969
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE MILLING CO., INC., HECTOR TORRES, FRANCISCO GOMEZ and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioners, Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), sought writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul certain resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 35253-R and 35254-R. The appeals in those cases were taken by respondents Philippine Milling Co., Inc., Francisco Gomez, Hector Torres, and Federico Santiago from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which dismissed one case and ordered the transfer of shares of stock to DBP in the other.
The respondents, as appellants in the Court of Appeals, were granted extensions to file their brief. After two extensions, a third extension was granted until November 21, 1966. On November 24, 1966, respondents sought a fourth extension of thirty days from November 26, 1966. DBP objected and moved to dismiss the appeal on November 26, 1966, arguing that the motion for extension was filed late (after the expiration of the third extension on November 21). The Court of Appeals granted the 30-day extension on November 28, 1966. Subsequently, both PNB and DBP filed motions to dismiss the appeal, which were denied by the Court of Appeals on December 2, 1966. The Court of Appeals also denied a motion for reconsideration on December 9, 1966. Petitioners then filed the present action, contending that the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal due to respondents’ failure to file the motion for extension on time, and thus had a ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in granting the fourth extension to file the appellants’ brief and in denying the motions to dismiss the appeal.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for. The Court held that Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which allows dismissal of an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary period, confers a discretionary power upon the Court of Appeals, not a mandatory duty. The provision is directory, not mandatory. Thus, the Court of Appeals had discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal, and such discretion must be exercised soundly in accordance with justice and fair play. The presumption is that this discretion was properly exercised. Petitioners failed to rebut this presumption or show grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no legal basis for petitioners’ claim that the Court of Appeals had a ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal, citing precedents such as Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo and Alquiza v. Alquiza. Costs were imposed against the petitioners.