GR L 26693; (August, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-26693. August 21, 1974. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and FELIPE PAPA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the registered owner of land in Quezon City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267, filed a complaint for recovery of possession against respondent Felipe Papa, who had occupied a portion of the property without consent. The Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision on November 28, 1958, ordering Papa to vacate the land and remove his constructions. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 14, 1966, and became final and executory. The lower court, then presided by respondent Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, issued a writ of execution on June 27, 1966. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for a special order of demolition.
However, on July 30, 1966, respondent Judge issued a challenged order holding in abeyance any final action on the motion for demolition and the enforcement of the judgment. He based this delay on the pending resolution by the Supreme Court of G.R. Nos. L-24559, L-26127, L-26128, and L-26129, which involved appeals from a lower court decision that had declared null and void all titles derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735βthe very root of petitioner’s title. Respondent Papa had earlier raised this as a ground to question the execution, arguing it cast “serious doubts” on petitioner’s ownership.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of July 30, 1966, which suspended the execution of a final and executory judgment pending the outcome of unrelated Supreme Court cases challenging the validity of the petitioner’s title.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, nullified the challenged order, and remanded the case for expeditious action on the motion for demolition. The legal logic is anchored on the finality and immutability of judgments. The decision against respondent Papa for recovery of possession had long become final and executory. A final judgment is no longer subject to change, alteration, or modification, save for clerical errors or the discovery of supervening facts that constitute a compelling reason for its execution to be stayed. The mere pendency of another case, even if it theoretically challenges the basis of a party’s title, does not by itself constitute a legal ground to suspend the execution of a final judgment. The execution of a final judgment is a matter of right for the prevailing party.
Crucially, the Supreme Court had already rendered a decision on June 28, 1974, in the very cases (Benin v. Tuason, et al.) cited by the respondent Judge as justification for the delay. That decision, penned by Justice Zaldivar, thoroughly reviewed the facts and precedents and definitively settled any doubts regarding the validity of titles derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Therefore, at the time the Supreme Court resolved this certiorari petition, the sole reason cited by the respondent Judge for suspending executionβthe pending resolution of those casesβhad been rendered moot and without legal basis. The respondent Judge’s order, while perhaps initially prompted by caution, constituted a grave abuse of discretion as it unjustly deprived the petitioner of the fruits of its final judgment based on a reason that was, and is, entirely untenable.
