GR L 26668; (April, 1972) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-26668 April 27, 1972
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALEJANDRO DIMANA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Alejandro Dimana was charged in the Municipal Court of Kibawe, Bukidnon, with “Destruction of Public Forest” under Section 2751(b) of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended. The complaint alleged that on or about April 3, 1965, he unlawfully entered the Kibawe Forest Reserve, made kaingin, and cut timber valued at P7,163.47. Dimana pleaded guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment and a fine of P7,163.47, which he served. Subsequently, the Provincial Fiscal, upon finding that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction because the imposable fine exceeded the court’s jurisdictional limit, filed a new information for the same act in the Court of First Instance (CFI).
Dimana moved to quash the CFI information on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution opposed, arguing the municipal court lacked jurisdiction from the outset. The trial court granted the motion to quash, holding that double jeopardy had attached. The People appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the filing of the second information in the Court of First Instance placed the appellee in double jeopardy for the same offense.
RULING
Yes, double jeopardy barred the second prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order quashing the information. The legal logic hinges on the nature of the offense and the municipal court’s jurisdiction. The offense charged, defined under Section 2751(b), involves unlawful entry upon a public forest or reserve and causing damage thereto. This constitutes the crime of “trespass on Government property,” over which municipal courts had jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act.
The Court rejected the prosecution’s theory that the municipal court was incompetent due to the fine imposed. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the law defining the offense, not by the penalty ultimately imposed. The complaint sufficiently alleged facts constituting “trespass on Government property.” Therefore, the municipal court validly acquired jurisdiction. Dimana’s valid conviction and service of sentence constituted first jeopardy. A second prosecution for the same act, even if filed in a court of higher jurisdiction, violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court also emphasized that justice demanded Dimana not be prosecuted again for an offense he had already expiated.