G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969
CITY OF BAGUIO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION, FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ, petitioners, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

On April 12, 1912, cadastral proceedings (Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite) were instituted. The land involved (Plan Psu-186187) was declared public land by final decision on November 13, 1922. On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen the case to register the land in his name, claiming possession since Spanish times and that his illiterate Igorot predecessors had no personal notice of the proceedings. Private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz opposed the reopening on December 18, 1961, asserting they were tree farm lessees under agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in 1959. The City of Baguio also opposed on May 5, 1962. The cadastral court initially denied private petitioners’ right to intervene based on a declaratory judgment in another case (Yaranon vs. Castrillo) that declared such tree farm leases null and void, but later reversed itself and allowed them to cross-examine witnesses. On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners’ opposition. All petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment but ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening. Petitioners sought redress from the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether private petitioners, as lessees, have the personality to appear and oppose the reopening proceedings under Republic Act 931.
2. Whether the reopening petition under R.A. 931 should have been published in accordance with the Cadastral Act.
3. Whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period preceding the approval of R.A. 931.

RULING

1. YES, private petitioners have the personality to oppose. Republic Act 931 grants the right to petition for reopening only for parcels of land “as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government.” This statutory phrase implicitly recognizes the interest of lessees. If the land has already been leased by the government, the petition cannot prosper. Lessees have a sufficient legal interest in the proceedings because proving the lease is enough to bar the reopening petition under R.A. 931, without needing to inquire into ownership. Their right to intervene is supported by the Rules of Court, as persons with a “legal interest in the matter in litigation.” The cadastral court should rule on the validity of the tree farm leases on the merits.
2. NO, publication is not required. The Supreme Court, citing its recent decision in De Castro vs. Marcos, held that publication of the reopening petition is not necessary. The purpose of R.A. 931 is to reopen a specific case already terminated, not to initiate a new one. The law itself does not require publication, and its omission cannot be construed as a fatal defect.
3. NO, the petition was filed within the period. Petitioners argued that the 40-year period in R.A. 931 (“within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act”) refers to the time of the institution of the judicial proceedings (the cadastral case in 1912), not the date of the decision (1922). Since the Act was approved in 1953, counting 40 years back from 1953 would exclude 1912. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The phrase “judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years” refers to the proceedings themselves, not their commencement date. The cadastral proceedings, which began in 1912 and concluded with a decision in 1922, were “instituted” within the meaning of the law. The legislative intent, gleaned from congressional records, was to allow reopening of cases decided within the 40-year period, not merely commenced within it. Therefore, the petition was timely filed.