G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The City of Manila is the registered owner of parcels of land in Malate. Shortly after liberation, from 1945 to 1947, the defendants-appellants entered and built houses of second-class materials on the premises without the city’s knowledge, consent, or the required building permits. In 1947 and 1948, some defendants were given written permits labeled “lease contracts” by the Mayors (Fugoso and de la Fuente) to occupy specific areas upon payment of nominal rentals. The rest of the 23 defendants had no permits. The city needed the land for the expansion of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. In 1961, the City Engineer directed defendants to vacate within 30 days, followed by a demand from the City Treasurer in 1962 for payment of accrued rentals and to vacate within 15 days. Defendants refused, prompting the City to file a suit for recovery of possession. The trial court ordered defendants to vacate, pay accrued rentals, and continue paying until they vacate. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
2. Whether defendants acquired the legal status of tenants.
3. Whether the houses and constructions constitute a public nuisance.
4. Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the case.

RULING

1. Yes. The trial court properly found the city’s need for the premises. The court could take judicial notice of Manila Ordinance 4566, which appropriated funds for the construction of an additional school building. Furthermore, the city’s dominical right to possession is paramount; defendants had no right to remain regardless of the city’s specific need. Any error in the finding of need was harmless.
2. No. Defendants did not acquire the status of tenants. Their initial entry and construction were illegal, making them squatters. The permits issued by the mayors, erroneously called “lease contracts,” were null and void. The Mayor of Manila has no authority to legalize forcible entry into public property. Squatting is unlawful and cannot be validated by official permits.
3. Yes. The houses and constructions constitute a public nuisance per se because they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, prejudicing the education of the youth and obstructing the government’s constitutional duty to provide public education. The nuisance could be summarily abated by the city authorities.
4. Yes. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction. Defendants’ forcible entry occurred from 1945 to 1947, and their possession remained illegal. The suit was filed in 1962, long after the one-year period for forcible entry actions under Rule 70, Rule of Court. Therefore, jurisdiction properly vested in the Court of First Instance.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Costs against defendants-appellants.