G.R. No. L-260; March 25, 1946
FELIPE SAAVEDRA, petitioner, vs. POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Zamboanga, respondent.

FACTS

On December 18, 1945, Valeriano Turija filed a complaint in the municipal court of Zamboanga against petitioner Felipe Saavedra to recover an automobile valued at P450. Turija alleged the car belonged to him but was seized by Japanese forces during the enemy occupation. After liberation, the car came into the possession of the PCAU and was later transferred by an American enlisted man, Arthur D. Walker, to Saavedra. Saavedra filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the municipal court lacked jurisdiction because the car, having been appropriated by the Japanese, had become enemy state property and thus any claim should be adjudicated by the Office of the Custodian of Enemy Property. On January 2, 1946, the municipal court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Turija appealed. After hearing arguments, respondent Judge Potenciano Pecson of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga issued an order on January 7, 1946, reversing the dismissal, declaring the municipal court had jurisdiction, and remanding the case for further proceedings. Saavedra’s motion for reconsideration was denied on January 11, 1946. Saavedra then petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the respondent judge’s order as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order of January 7, 1946, which reversed the municipal court’s order of dismissal and held that the municipal court had jurisdiction over the case.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction. Under Section 10 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, when an inferior court disposes of an action upon a question of law and not after a trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance on appeal shall review that ruling and may affirm or reverse it. Here, the municipal court’s dismissal was based purely on a legal question (jurisdiction), not a merits trial, so the respondent judge had appellate power to review and reverse that ruling. Furthermore, the respondent judge’s order was correct on the merits. The municipal court clearly had jurisdiction because the value of the automobile (P450) was within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts and courts of first instance. The petitioner’s theory that the car became enemy state property due to its seizure by Japanese forces was without merit; such illegal seizure could not change the legal character of the property, which remained privately owned. The litigation was between two private citizens over property within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. The proper remedy for the petitioner, if aggrieved, was an appeal, not a special civil action for certiorari, but an appeal would have been futile as the order was legally sound. Costs were taxed against the petitioner.