G.R. No. L-25677 November 29, 1968
JOVITO O. VITANZO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS OF THE DEFUNCT NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ILDEFONSO LABAO, MARCELO MANTALA, ESEFINA DE MUHI and VICTORINO MORENO, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Eusebio Arceo was the registered owner of five parcels of land in Marinduque. A final judgment for a sum of money was rendered against Arceo in favor of the Republic, represented by the Liquidators of the National Coconut Corporation. A writ of execution was issued on February 2, 1962. The Provincial Sheriff of Marinduque received the writ on July 7, 1962, and levied on the lands on the same date. The execution sale was held on March 16, 1963, where the defendants-appellees and the Board of Liquidators were the successful bidders for the lots. On February 13, 1964, the heirs of the deceased judgment debtor, Eusebio Arceo, executed a “Deed of Assignment in Payment of Debt” in favor of appellant Jovito Vitanzo, conveying their rights to the lands. On February 21, 1964, Vitanzo filed a complaint for reconveyance, claiming the levy and sale were null and void because the levy was not made during the lifetime of the writ and no alias writ was issued. The defendants-appellees Board of Liquidators and Ildefonso Labao filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff Vitanzo appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The sole issue raised is the validity of the Sheriff’s levy. Specifically, whether the levy was void for not being made within 60 days from the issuance of the writ of execution, which appellant claims is the writ’s lifetime.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, ruling that the Sheriff’s levy was valid. The Court held that the lifetime of a writ of execution includes the last day it is returnable. Under Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the writ may be made returnable within 60 days after its receipt by the officer. Since the Sheriff levied on the properties on the same day he received the writ (July 7, 1962), the levy was made within the writ’s lifetime. The fact that the sale was held long after the 60-day period for the writ’s return does not affect the validity of the sale. A valid execution issued and levy made within the period provided by law may be enforced by a sale thereafter. The levy is the essential act that sets the property apart for the satisfaction of the judgment, and after levy, the judgment debtor’s interest is limited to the property’s application to the judgment, irrespective of when it is sold. Costs were assessed against appellant Vitanzo.