G.R. No. L-25521; February 28, 1966
GREGORIO FERINION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA, RESURRECCION RAMOS, BASILIA FERINION and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Four successive cases involving the same causes of action, subject matter, and substantially the same parties were filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The first case (Civil Case No. 1792), filed on March 17, 1955 by Sinforosa, Felicidad, and Gregorio Ferinion, sought the annulment of a power of attorney and two real estate mortgages executed by their co-owner Basilia Ferinion in favor of spouses Diosdado Sta. Romana and Resurreccion Ramos. It was dismissed without prejudice on February 24, 1956, due to the non-attendance of plaintiffs and their counsel. The second case (Civil Case No. 2206), filed on July 9, 1956 by Gregorio and Sinforosa Ferinion (excluding Felicidad), contained the same averments. Upon plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, the court, on September 3, 1956, dismissed the complaint “with prejudice.” The third case (Civil Case No. 2502), filed on April 15, 1957 by Sinforosa, Felicidad, and Gregorio Ferinion, again sought annulment of the same documents and added a prayer for reconveyance and damages after the mortgages were foreclosed. Upon plaintiffs’ notice of dismissal joining defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court dismissed the case on May 2, 1958. After a lapse of 6 years, 9 months, and 23 days, Gregorio Ferinion alone filed the fourth and instant complaint (Civil Case No. SD-116) on February 25, 1965, seeking annulment of the deeds and title concerning his share. The trial court dismissed this fourth complaint “with prejudice” on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE

Whether the fourth complaint filed by Gregorio Ferinion is barred by the principle of res judicata.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that res judicata had set in. The three previous complaints, which involved substantially the same causes of action, subject matter, and parties, had all been dismissed by final orders of the trial court (the second and third dismissals being “with prejudice”). Public policy and sound practice demand finality of judgments to end controversies and prevent endless litigation. The plaintiff, dissatisfied with the dismissal of the second case, should have pursued the remedies accorded by law instead of filing successive independent actions to revive a lawfully terminated suit. The appeal was deemed manifestly frivolous.