G.R. No. L-25337 November 27, 1967
Delfin Mayormente, petitioner, vs. Robaco Corporation and/or its Manager; The Hon. Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne of the CIR and The Court of Industrial Relations, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Delfin Mayormente, a pauper litigant, filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to set aside an order of respondent Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The order transferred the hearing of Case No. 182-V-Cebu from Cebu City to Butuan City. The petitioner had filed the case in Cebu City against respondent Robaco Corporation. After the reception of the petitioner’s evidence, the respondent judge set the hearing in Butuan City, the place of business of the company. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The petition charges the respondent judge with acting in excess of jurisdiction and with abuse of discretion. The respondents justify the order based on the CIR’s jurisdiction over the entire Philippines under Commonwealth Act 103 and claim the petition is premature for not being elevated first to the CIR in banc.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petition for certiorari is premature for not being elevated first to the CIR in banc.
2. Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the transfer of the hearing venue from Cebu City to Butuan City.

RULING

1. No, the petition for certiorari is not premature. The Court distinguished between an appeal by certiorari (governed by Commonwealth Act 103 and Rule 43) and a special civil action of certiorari (governed by Rule 65). The requirement for a motion for reconsideration before the CIR in banc applies to appeals by certiorari, as an appeal lies only from a decision of the Court acting as a body. A special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is available against any officer exercising judicial functions, such as an individual CIR judge, who acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, provided there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. An appeal was inadequate here, as relief from the interlocutory order would be useless by the time of final judgment, making certiorari appropriate.
2. Yes, the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court held that the issue was one of venue, not jurisdiction. Republic Act 1171 expressly provides that civil actions by employees may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff. This choice of venue, given to the plaintiff employee, would be rendered meaningless if it could be subsequently transferred. The CIR’s nationwide jurisdiction does not justify changing venue. The respondent judge’s reasoning that the company had a “right” to be heard in its place of business was palpable error. The discretion to transfer venue is not unfettered and must be informed by legal principles. Compellingly, the petitioner was a pauper litigant, and the constitutional mandate to afford protection to labor requires that “he who has less in life should have more in law.” The order transferring venue was set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings in Cebu City.