G.R. No. L-24932 June 27, 1968
ENRIQUE B. DOMINGO, ET AL., plaintiffs, ENRIQUE B. DOMINGO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiffs, legitimate children of the late Eustaquio Beltran by his first marriage, sued defendants, collateral heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz (Eustaquio’s second wife), for partition of real properties and bank deposits claimed as conjugal assets of Eustaquio and Pelagia. Plaintiffs alleged Eustaquio brought into the marriage a ten-hectare rice land, whose income was used to purchase two lots. Defendants claimed the rice land never belonged to Eustaquio, one lot was acquired by Pelagia with her own money after Eustaquio’s death, and the other was a Friar Land purchased by Pelagia from the Government, with title issued in her name alone. Defendants filed a request for admission regarding the ownership of the rice land. Plaintiffs’ answer to this request was not under oath. Defendants then moved for summary judgment, contending no genuine issue of material fact existed. Plaintiffs did not serve opposing affidavits. The lower court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the case on June 8, 1964. Plaintiffs were served with the judgment on June 20, 1964. On October 23, 1964, plaintiffs filed a petition for relief from judgment, alleging fraud by defendants in connivance with one plaintiff, Victoriano Beltran, specifically through Victoriano’s dismissal of the original counsel and hiring of a new lawyer who allegedly failed to properly prosecute the case due to a conflict of interest.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for relief from judgment was filed properly within the reglementary period.

RULING

No. The petition for relief was filed out of time. Under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, such a petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment. The plaintiffs learned of the judgment on June 20, 1964, but filed the petition only on October 23, 1964, which is 125 days later, well beyond the 60-day period. The appellant’s claim that the period should be counted from the denial of a motion for reconsideration was unsupported by the record. Furthermore, the alleged fraud (intramural misunderstanding among plaintiffs regarding legal representation and the new lawyer’s failure to file a memorandum) did not constitute extrinsic fraud that would warrant relief, and such a memorandum would not have altered the result since the summary judgment was based on plaintiffs’ failure to deny under oath the request for admission and their failure to serve opposing affidavits to the motion for summary judgment. The order denying the petition for relief was affirmed.