G.R. No. L-24406 June 29, 1965
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONER ENRIQUE MEDINA, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FRANCISCO A. PERFECTO, GREGORIO C. PANGANIBAN, JOSIAS QUINTO, ALEX F. DE GUZMAN, and JOSE A. FORNIER REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

The Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed an application with the Public Service Commission (PSC) for approval of revised (increased) rate schedules. After hearing, a division of three Commissioners rendered a decision on March 15, 1965, approving the proposed terms and conditions but reducing the proposed rate increases. The decision expressly provided that the increases “shall be effective from the date of this decision.” The Solicitor General filed a petition for reconsideration and moved ex parte to suspend the effectivity of the decision. On the same day, March 19, 1965, the Commission, without notice or hearing for MERALCO, issued an order suspending the effectivity of the decision. MERALCO moved for a hearing to oppose the suspension, but no action was taken. Subsequently, Commissioner Enrique Medina, acting alone, issued orders (Annexes “C” and “E”) that effectively delayed the hearing and resolution of the motions for reconsideration. MERALCO petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to set aside the suspension order and for mandamus to compel the PSC to immediately hear and resolve the motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Public Service Commission acted in accordance with law in suspending the effectivity of its decision authorizing rate increases.
2. Whether Commissioner Enrique Medina, acting alone, had the authority to issue the orders (Annexes “C” and “E”) that deferred the consideration of the motions for reconsideration.

RULING

1. On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the Public Service Commission acted without legal authority in suspending the effectivity of its decision. Section 33 of the Public Service Act explicitly provides that orders “prescribing rates to be charged shall be immediately operative.” The law confers no discretion upon the Commission to suspend such orders. This lack of authority is further emphasized by Section 37 of the same Act, which grants only the Supreme Court the power to stay a Commission order, implying the denial of such power to the Commission itself. The Court rejected the argument that the power to suspend is implied from the power to reconsider, stating that no such power can be implied where the express terms of the statute are to the contrary. Furthermore, the suspension order was issued upon an ex parte motion without giving MERALCO an opportunity to be heard, constituting a denial of due process. The order also amounted to an amendment of the final decision without notice and hearing, which is illegal.
2. On the second issue, the Court found it unnecessary to make a definitive ruling since the periods for filing motions and oppositions had already elapsed. However, it noted that under Section 3 of the Public Service Act, jurisdiction to act on a motion for reconsideration of a non-interlocutory order vests in the Commission en banc, requiring the concurrence of at least four Commissioners. Commissioner Medina could not act alone on such motions unless such power was properly delegated, and no such delegation was shown.
The writs of certiorari and mandamus were granted. The PSC’s order of March 19, 1965, suspending the rate increases, was declared illegal, null, and void. The Public Service Commission was directed to immediately hear and promptly resolve the motions for reconsideration of its decision of March 15, 1965. No costs were awarded.