G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
Tomas Velasco, et al., petitioners-appellants, vs. Hon. Antonio J. Villegas, City Mayor of Manila, et al., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The petitioners, members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Manila City Ordinance No. 4964. The ordinance prohibited barbershop operators from conducting massage services for customers in any adjacent room or within the same building if the same person operated both the barbershop and the massage facility. The petitioners contended that this ordinance amounted to a deprivation of their property and means of livelihood without due process of law.
The lower court dismissed the petition. It noted that criminal cases for violations of this ordinance had already been filed and decided against the petitioners. Consequently, the court held that declaratory relief was no longer an available remedy, as its availability presupposes that no such case involving the same issue has been initiated or adjudicated.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court correctly dismissed the petition for declaratory relief and, assuming the petition was procedurally proper, whether Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order of dismissal. On the procedural aspect, the Court agreed that a petition for declaratory relief does not lie when, as in this case, there are already criminal cases filed and decided for violation of the very ordinance sought to be challenged. The remedy of declaratory relief is prospective and preventive, intended to settle disputes before obligations are breached or rights violated, not after judicial action has already been undertaken.
Even assuming the petition was procedurally proper, the constitutional challenge would still fail. The Court upheld Ordinance No. 4964 as a valid exercise of the city’s police power under the general welfare clause. The respondents-appellees justified the ordinance as having two legitimate objectives: first, to properly impose the distinct license fee for massage clinics under a separate ordinance, and second, to forestall possible immorality that might arise from the operation of separate massage rooms in connection with barbershops. Citing established jurisprudence, beginning with U.S. v. Salaveria, the Court emphasized its liberal policy in sustaining municipal ordinances enacted under the general welfare clause to promote public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. There was no showing that the ordinance was capricious, oppressive, or beyond the scope of the city’s regulatory authority. Therefore, it did not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law.