G.R. No. L-23973; April 29, 1969
CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN VERDAGUER, EMILIO VILLASIN, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Cipriano Verastigue, et al., filed a special civil action for mandamus and certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. The case originated from a cadastral proceeding where the Court of First Instance, sitting as a cadastral court, reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision, declaring null and void the decrees and certificates of title issued for Lot No. 5387, as it found the lot was already covered by a prior Torrens Title (Certificate of Title No. 75) issued in 1914. Petitioners failed to appeal this decision within the reglementary period. Subsequently, private respondents moved for and were granted a writ of possession by the cadastral court on March 27, 1961. Petitioners received a copy of the order granting the writ on March 28, 1961, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on September 27, 1961, after which the writ was issued. Petitioners challenged the cadastral court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ and alleged a denial of due process.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of First Instance, sitting as a cadastral court, has jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession.
2. Whether petitioners were denied procedural due process in the issuance of the writ of possession.

RULING

1. YES. The Supreme Court affirmed that a cadastral court has the power to issue a writ of possession. This is established in Abellera v. De Guzman, which held that after hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner and entitled to possession and issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession. This doctrine is rooted in earlier jurisprudence, including Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac and Corders v. Court of First Instance of Laguna. The Court further cited Marcelo v. Mencias, which upheld the authority of a land registration court to order demolition as a consequence of a writ of possession.
2. NO. Petitioners were not denied procedural due process. While the initial order granting the writ was issued ex parte on March 27, 1961, petitioners received a copy the next day and filed a motion for reconsideration, which was heard and denied on September 27, 1961. The Court, citing Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cadiao, ruled that any defect from absence of prior notice was cured by the opportunity to be heard on the motion for reconsideration. Due process requires fairness and an opportunity to be heard, which was satisfied here.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing the petition for mandamus and certiorari, with costs against petitioners.