GR L 23906; (June, 1968) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-23906 June 22, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JULIAN MONTON, ENRIQUE MONSALE, SALVADOR MONSALE, SATURNINO MONSALE, JUAN LINO-ON, ALBANO PATAGNI, PABLO NABONG and ALFONSO MONTAGOT, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
A criminal complaint for libel was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Miagao, Iloilo, against the defendants-appellees for preparing, signing, and sending a communication to the President denouncing alleged illegal acts of Jose P. Monteclaro as City Fiscal of Iloilo. The complaint was dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court for lack of probable cause. Subsequently, the provincial fiscal filed a new information for the same crime before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The accused filed a motion to quash on two grounds: (a) the information contained averments constituting a legal excuse or justification, and (b) it was filed without due process for want of preliminary investigation. The trial court granted the motion, ruling the letter was a privileged private communication. The prosecution’s first appeal (G.R. No. L-16772) resulted in the Supreme Court setting aside the dismissal, holding the prosecution was entitled to present evidence on malice, and remanding the case for the trial court to address the second ground regarding preliminary investigation. The trial court then conducted a hearing on whether a preliminary investigation had been held. The prosecution presented the affidavit of the offended party and a certificate from Asst. Provincial Fiscal Eugenio M. Gison stating he conducted the preliminary investigation. The accused presented evidence showing the original complaint’s dismissal and that they were never summoned by the provincial fiscal for investigation. The trial court ruled no preliminary investigation was held because the affidavit did not show the offended party was personally examined with “searching questions” by Fiscal Gison, and the certificate did not state a preliminary investigation was conducted under his direction with witnesses examined under oath. The State appealed a second time.
ISSUE
1. Whether a preliminary investigation was necessary after the dismissal of the charge by the Justice of the Peace Court and the filing of a new information by the fiscal.
2. Whether a preliminary investigation was in fact conducted in this case.
RULING
1. Yes, a preliminary investigation was necessary. The Supreme Court held that when a complaint is dismissed after preliminary investigation and a new information is filed, the accused cannot be brought to trial unless another preliminary investigation is made. This right is substantial, and its denial subjects the accused to loss of life, liberty, or property without due process. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that preliminary investigation could be dispensed with in libel cases because the document itself is sufficient, stating there is no legal exception to the requirement.
2. No, a preliminary investigation was not conducted. The Court found nothing in the evidence to reasonably support the claim that Asst. Provincial Fiscal Gison conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. The affidavit of the complainant was subscribed before the Clerk of Court, not Fiscal Gison, and did not show the offended party was personally investigated. The certification by Fiscal Gison was unsupported by other evidence, and the fiscal could not produce the records, alleging they were lost. The manner of conducting preliminary investigation requires the officer to take testimony under oath. The certification presupposes good faith and actual conduct of the investigation, which was not proven. As the accused did not waive their right and consistently demanded it, the trial court committed no error in granting the motion to quash. The order of dismissal was affirmed.
