GR L 239; (June, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-239; June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. APOLONIO CARLOS, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The appellant, Apolonio Carlos, was convicted of treason by the People’s Court and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, a fine of P7,000, and costs. The undisputed findings of the lower court established that in July or August 1944, around 2 or 3 a.m., Carlos, acting as a Japanese spy, alighted from a truck with Japanese military police on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He pointed out the houses of Martin Mateo and Fermin Javier to the Japanese soldiers. The soldiers broke into both houses, seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo, and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and placed them in the truck. Along with other persons rounded up from other places, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Javier were tortured and detained for six days. Martin and Ladislao Mateo were arrested and maltreated for refusing to divulge the whereabouts of their guerrilla brother, Marcelino Mateo. Fermin Javier, a guerrilla himself, was arrested and tortured based on Carlos’s knowledge or suspicion of his guerrilla activities.
ISSUE
The appellant raised four legal errors:
1. Whether the accused could be convicted of treason against the U.S. and Philippine governments, as the political laws defining and penalizing treason were suspended during the Japanese occupation.
2. Whether the Philippine treason laws, being inconsistent with the Japanese occupation, were suspended and without force during that period.
3. Whether the allegiance of inhabitants to the former governments was temporarily suspended during enemy occupation, thus negating the element of allegiance necessary for treason.
4. Whether the law creating the People’s Court is unconstitutional.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
1. On the first three assignments of error: The Court ruled that the questions regarding suspended allegiance, change of sovereignty, and the effect of occupation on treason laws were already squarely raised and decided in Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil., 856). That precedent controls this appeal, and therefore, the first three assignments of error were overruled.
2. On the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act: The Court addressed the appellant’s specific challenges:
* Regarding the title of the Act: The various provisos cited by the appellant (e.g., jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, jurisdiction over other crimes, disqualifications of Supreme Court Justices, changes to bail rules, suspension of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code) were held to be allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The constitutional requirement is satisfied if all parts of the law relate to the subject expressed in its title; the title need not be a complete index of its contents.
* Regarding equal protection: The Court found that the classifications and procedures established by the People’s Court Act (e.g., six-month filing period, denial of preliminary investigation, limited right to appeal, special composition of the Supreme Court for certain appeals, special bail rules for detainees released by the U.S. Army) were created under the stress of an emergency and for reasons of national security and economic necessity. While the first proposition pointed to a situation “bordering” on a transgression of equal protection, the law did not show a clear purpose of making a discrimination that would nullify it. Matters of public policy not violating the fundamental law are within the province of Congress.
* Regarding other constitutional challenges: The appellant’s propositions concerning the potential for Congress to remove specific cases from existing courts, the limited choice of judges, and the Solicitor General’s prosecutorial discretion were deemed serious but not amounting to a violation of the fundamental law that would nullify the statute, as they involved matters of public policy.
Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court voted to affirm the lower court’s decision.
