G.R. No. L-23408 November 24, 1972
DOLORES NARAG, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SALVADOR CECILIO and ANTONIO CECILIO, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Dolores Narag filed an amended complaint alleging that her father, Jose Cecilio, gave her two parcels of land in 1924 via a deed of donation mortis causa. After the execution of the deed, she declared the properties in her name and possessed them continuously, publicly, and adversely as owner. Upon her father’s death in 1950, the defendants, who were her half-brothers, forcibly took possession of the lands. Despite her demands, they refused to return them, prompting her to file an action for recovery of possession.
The defendants, in their answer, raised an affirmative defense that the complaint lacked an allegation that Narag’s possession was “in good faith and with just title.” The lower court sustained this defense. It ruled that the donation mortis causa had previously been declared invalid by the Supreme Court for lacking the formalities of a will. Consequently, the court held that Narag’s claim did not satisfy the requirement that the title for prescription must be “true and valid” under the Civil Code. On this basis, the lower court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to allege “just title” as a requisite for acquiring ownership through adverse possession under the applicable law.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal. The lower court committed a fundamental error in applying the provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. The controlling law is not the Civil Code but the former Code of Civil Procedure ( Act No. 190 ), as the relevant facts—possession commencing in 1924—occurred prior to its effectivity. Section 41 of Act No. 190 governs the acquisition of title through adverse possession.
The legal logic is clear and settled. Under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person who claims ownership of real property and possesses it adversely, continuously, and openly for a period of ten years acquires “a full and complete title.” This Court has consistently held, since the 1908 case of Altman v. Commanding Officer, that such acquisition does not require “just title” or good faith. Adverse possession under this statute is founded on the fact of possession itself, provided it is actual, open, public, continuous, and under a claim of title exclusive of any other right. The lower court’s insistence on a “true and valid” title was a misapplication of the law. Narag’s claim, based on adverse possession since 1924, was sufficient to vest title in her under Section 41, regardless of the invalidity of the donation mortis causa. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.