G.R. No. L-23098; February 28, 1967
Domingo T. Jacinto, petitioner, vs. Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, The Sheriff of Manila, Alpha Investments and Finance Corporation and Pastor D. Ago, respondents.

FACTS

On April 23, 1959, Alpha Investments and Finance Corporation filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover a sum of money from Pastor D. Ago and Domingo T. Jacinto, the latter having guaranteed Ago’s solvency. Jacinto was declared in default for failure to answer the complaint. Subsequently, on November 15, 1960, a “Stipulation of Facts and Compromise Agreement” was executed, admitting joint and several liability for the debt. This agreement was signed by L.L. Reyes for the plaintiff, by Pastor D. Ago “For Defendants,” and by Atty. Jose M. Luison as “Counsel for Defendants.” Jacinto was not a signatory. On November 18, 1960, the trial court approved the compromise and rendered judgment in accordance with it. For failure to comply, the plaintiff secured an alias writ of execution on April 1, 1964. Upon being served, Jacinto moved to quash the writ, alleging the judgment based on the compromise was not binding on him as he was not a party to it, did not authorize his co-defendant or counsel to represent him, and no evidence was presented against him after his default. The trial court denied his motion. Jacinto’s properties were levied upon. He first filed a petition with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. He then resorted to the Supreme Court via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Alpha argued the petition was improper as Jacinto had other remedies and that the compromise was binding. Respondent Ago and his counsel manifested they did not represent Jacinto in the agreement and the use of “defendants” was a typographical error.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of certiorari and prohibition is a proper remedy to challenge the enforcement of a judgment based on a compromise agreement against a party who did not authorize or participate in said compromise.

RULING

Yes, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies. The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring the orders issuing the original and alias writs of execution null and void as against petitioner Jacinto and making the preliminary injunction permanent. The Court held that the judgment based on the compromise agreement was not binding on Jacinto. He was declared in default, and no evidence was presented against him. More critically, the compromise was signed by his co-defendant Ago and counsel without Jacinto’s special authority, which is mandatory under Section 23, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court for attorneys to compromise a client’s litigation. Since Jacinto was not a party to the compromise and never agreed to it, the judgment based thereon was null and void as to him. Consequently, the trial court acted without jurisdiction in ordering its execution against him. While certiorari generally requires the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the Court ruled it was appropriate here. Remedies like a petition for relief from judgment or an appeal from the execution order were rendered inadequate or ineffective because the writ of execution was already in the process of being carried out, threatening to deprive Jacinto of his property without due process. Citing precedent, the Court held that certiorari lies against a void judgment for which there is no longer any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.