G.R. No. L-22540. July 31, 1964.
BARTOLOME LAWSIN, petitioner, vs. HON. GODOFREDO ESCALONA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch I, and VIRGINIO A. ASTILLA, respondents.

FACTS

In the 1963 elections, petitioner Bartolome Lawsin and respondent Virginio Astilla were candidates for councilor in Tacloban City. Astilla filed a petition (Election Case No. 3423) in the Court of First Instance, alleging a discrepancy in Precinct No. 65: the election returns credited Lawsin with 75 votes, while the tally board and certificates showed only 65. Astilla claimed this 10-vote error, if corrected, would entitle him to win by an 8-vote margin, and he prayed for a judicial recount of the votes in that precinct.
Lawsin opposed the petition, arguing it stated no cause of action because a discrepancy between election returns and a tally board is not a legal ground for a recount under the Revised Election Code. He also raised the defense of litis pendentia and res judicata, noting that Astilla had previously filed a separate petition (Election Case No. 3415) seeking to compel the correction of the same election returns based on the identical discrepancy. That prior correction case had been dismissed by Branch I of the same court, a dismissal affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-22246.

ISSUE

Whether a discrepancy between the election returns and the corresponding tally board or tally sheet constitutes a sufficient legal ground for the Court of First Instance to order a judicial recount of votes under the Revised Election Code.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court ruled that a discrepancy between election returns and a tally board or sheet is not a valid ground for a judicial recount. The legal logic is anchored on a strict, restrictive interpretation of Sections 163 and 168 of the Revised Election Code, which authorize a recount only in specific, limited circumstances.
The Court, citing its precedent in Parlade vs. Quicho, held that a judicial recount under Section 163 is a special authority that must be construed restrictively. The law permits a recount only when there is a contradiction between “another copy or other authentic copies of the statement” (the election returns) submitted to the board of canvassers. The “authentic copies” refer exclusively to the other copies of the election returns themselves, as held in Galang vs. Miranda. A tally board, tally sheet, or certificate of votes issued to watchers is not an authentic copy of the election return contemplated by law. Therefore, a variance between the returns and such ancillary documents does not trigger the statutory authority for a recount. The legislature’s deliberate choice to omit references to tally boards in the relevant sections, despite their existence in prior laws, confirms this intent.
Furthermore, the Court found an independent and alternative ground for denying the recount: Astilla was guilty of splitting a single cause of action. The operative facts—the alleged discrepancy affecting the election result—were identical in his previously dismissed petition for correction of returns and the present petition for a recount. Having elected to pursue and ultimately lose the correction case, Astilla was barred by the rules against multiplicity of suits from litigating the same cause again under a different remedy. The dismissal in the first case (G.R. No. L-22246) thus constituted res judicata. Consequently, the orders of respondent Judge Escalona for a recount and to enjoin proclamation were revoked and set aside.