G.R. No. L-22320 May 22, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS

On February 25, 1959, respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso filed a civil case for recovery of a sum of money against petitioner Damaso P. Perez and Gregorio Subong. On April 11, 1960, a judgment was rendered against the defendants. Their appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time, and their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied. After the case was remanded, Hermoso moved for execution, which was granted. The Sheriff levied upon 3,573 shares of stock registered in Damaso Perez’s name. Perez moved to stay execution, arguing the levy was excessive. The Court of Appeals later sustained this position regarding the extent of the levy. Upon remand, the Sheriff scheduled a sale for a reduced number of shares. Petitioner Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, wife of Damaso, then filed separate actions (civil cases 7532 and 55292) claiming the levied shares were conjugal property and not answerable for her husband’s personal debt. These actions were either dismissed or the injunctions were lifted. She also filed a third-party claim with the Sheriff and a motion in the main case to recall the writ of execution, which the respondent Judge denied, stating she was not a party to the case and it was not the proper remedy. Damaso Perez filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The petitioners then filed the present petition for certiorari, arguing the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the writ of execution.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recall or quash the writ of execution levied upon shares of stock claimed to be conjugal property, allegedly not liable for the husband’s personal obligation.

RULING

No, the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the grounds for quashing a writ of execution, such as being improvidently issued, defective, issued against the wrong party, or where the debt has been paid, were not present. The petitioners’ attack was not on the validity of the writ itself but on the levy, for which the proper remedy is an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff, not a motion to quash the writ. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence to support the claim that the shares were conjugal; registration in the husband’s name alone indicated exclusive ownership. Even assuming the shares were conjugal, the petitioners failed to prove the judgment debt was a personal obligation of the husband alone. The obligation, contracted for leather used in his shoe business, was presumed to be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The Court condemned the petitioners’ protracted use of multiple legal actions to thwart the execution of a final judgment. The petition was dismissed, the preliminary injunction dissolved, and treble costs were assessed against the petitioners, to be paid by their counsel.