G.R. No. L-22; December 20, 1945
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENEDICTO JOSE Y SANTOS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On May 24, 1945, Benedicto Jose y Santos was accused of violating Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that: (1) prior to April 19, 1944, he was prosecuted and convicted in Criminal Case No. 3 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of the City of Greater Manila for violating sections of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with a Presidential Ordinance, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, which he began serving on April 19, 1944; (2) after serving about six months, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President of the Republic of the Philippines on October 15, 1944, which he accepted, leading to his release; and (3) while enjoying this pardon, he committed the crime of qualified theft in Manila prior to April 5, 1945, for which he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in Criminal Case No. A-605 of the Municipal Court, and was received at the New Bilibid Prison on April 5, 1945 to serve this new sentence. The defendant filed a motion to quash the information, arguing the judgment and pardon were void under General Douglas MacArthur’s proclamation, that the court was a creature of the Imperial Japanese Army, and that constitutional rights were denied. The City Fiscal opposed, arguing the defunct Republic was a de facto government and its acts should be upheld. The lower court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case, holding that the facts did not constitute an offense under Article 159, that the proceedings were void under MacArthur’s proclamation, and that the acts of the overthrown government perished with it. The City Fiscal appealed.

ISSUE

The issues are: (1) whether the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment imposed by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied validity after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; and (2) whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for allegedly violating the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s resolution dismissing the case. On the first issue, the Court held that the punitive sentence imposed on the appellee was of a political complexion. It penalized an act “not criminal by the municipal law” of the legitimate government—specifically, the violation of a Japanese-sponsored ordinance controlling the purchase and sale of rice and corn. Following the principles of postliminium and its prior decisions (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5; Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-49), such sentences of a political nature became of no effect upon the reoccupation and restoration of the Commonwealth Government. On the second issue, since the underlying conviction was null and void, the conditional pardon granted based on that conviction was also a nullity. Therefore, there was no valid pardon to violate, and the appellee could not be prosecuted under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code for its alleged violation.