GR L 21998; (November 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-21998 November 10, 1975
Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Ester T. Villablanca, Zosimo Villablanca, Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Plaintiffs-appellants Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance alleging they purchased a parcel of land from defendants-appellees Eustaquia and Catalina Bocar in November 1962, with the deed of sale duly notarized and registered. They further alleged that in February 1963, defendant spouses Ester and Zosimo Villablanca “illegally and without any right, whatsoever, took possession of the above property,” harvesting coconuts and depriving the plaintiffs of possession. The complaint prayed for the surrender of possession and damages.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending the action was for forcible entry falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court. The plaintiffs opposed, arguing their complaint lacked the essential allegation that dispossession was effected through “force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.” The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding it was a forcible entry case.
ISSUE
Whether the action pleaded in the complaint is one for forcible entry within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case. Jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the action as pleaded in the complaint. For an action to be one for forcible entry under Rule 70, the complaint must allege two essential elements: (1) the plaintiff’s prior physical possession of the property, and (2) that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The complaint in this case failed to allege either element. It did not state that the plaintiffs were ever in actual physical possession prior to the Villablancas’ entry. It merely stated the Villablancas “illegally” took possession, which is a conclusion of law insufficient to constitute the specific modes of dispossession required for forcible entry. Furthermore, the inclusion of a claim for warranty against eviction from the vendors indicated the action was not merely for the summary recovery of possession. Consequently, the action was not for forcible entry, and the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction.