G.R. No. L-21523; February 28, 1966
The minor NGO CHIAO LIN, as represented by NGO KEH, father of the minor, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

The minor petitioner, Ngo Chiao Lin, arrived in the Philippines on June 24, 1961, as a temporary visitor. At that time, his father, Ngo Keh, had a pending petition for naturalization. On August 28, 1961, the court granted the father’s naturalization. Subsequently, on October 16 and 20, 1961, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, acting under a Cabinet resolution dated February 29, 1956, authorized the change of the petitioner’s status to a special non-immigrant and extended his stay until August 28, 1963, conditioned upon payment of the corresponding fee. The petitioner paid the fee only up to March 23, 1962. On March 12, 1962, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner of Immigration for an indefinite extension of his stay. The Commissioner denied the application and ordered the petitioner to leave upon the expiration of his visa on March 23, 1962, citing an opinion from the new Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice that the Cabinet resolution granting them concurrent jurisdiction to extend stays was ineffective, as the law vested that power solely in the Commissioner of Immigration. The petitioner then filed an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prevent his deportation and to declare his right to stay until August 28, 1963. The trial court dismissed the petition, upholding the Commissioner’s authority and noting the petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The petitioner appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of prohibition is proper to prevent the Commissioner of Immigration from deporting the petitioner before August 28, 1963, based on the extension granted by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for prohibition. The Court held that prohibition would not lie for several reasons. First, the petitioner failed to comply with the condition of the extension by paying fees only up to March 23, 1962, not until August 28, 1963. Second, the petitioner’s visa had expired on March 23, 1962, necessitating his application for a new extension from the Commissioner. Third, the subsequent opinion of the new Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice in 1962, which recalled the extension and declared the Cabinet resolution ineffective, was as valid as the initial grant if the petitioner’s theory of Presidential authority were accepted. The Court emphasized that the temporary stay of an alien is a privilege, not a right, subject to public policy and the determinations of the proper authorities under the Immigration Law. Furthermore, the father’s grant of naturalization did not confer citizenship on the petitioner, as the father had not yet taken the oath of allegiance, and the two-year period for government inquiry had not expired. The trial court committed no error in dismissing the petition and dissolving the preliminary injunction.