G.R. No. L-21472 July 30, 1965
DOLORES C. VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN CANCIO, claimant-appellant.

FACTS

Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate, instituting his widow Isabel Herreros as his exclusive heir, with the condition that upon her death, the estate would go to his adopted son, Carlos Gil, Jr. The will was probated, and Isabel was appointed administratrix. Among the estate properties were two residential lots with a house in Guagua, Pampanga. During the Japanese occupation, Isabel and Carlos Gil, Jr. obtained a loan of P89,000 from Agustin Cancio. On November 21, 1944, they agreed to transfer the two lots to Cancio after final adjudication to them. Carlos Gil, Jr. died. On June 25, 1954, Isabel, as administratrix, filed a motion in the testate proceedings to authorize her to execute a deed of transfer to Cancio. Dolores C. Vda. de Carlos Gil, Jr., as guardian of her minor children, conformed. The probate court approved the motion on October 22, 1954, conditioned on the deed’s submission for approval. Isabel died in July 1956 before executing the deed. Dolores, as co-administratrix, executed the deed on July 3, 1956, and filed a motion for its approval. The court, on July 9, 1956, directed payment of estate taxes first. After years of inaction, Cancio filed a motion on April 1, 1959, reiterating the approval request, noting the Internal Revenue Commission agreed to registration despite unpaid taxes. Dolores opposed, arguing the original agreement was without court authority, the properties were never finally adjudicated, and the deed should be considered an equitable mortgage. The probate court denied the petition on January 25, 1961, setting aside its 1954 order, ruling the obligation was personal to Isabel and Carlos Gil, Jr., and the estate had no connection to it, so the matter should be threshed out in a separate action. Cancio appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the probate court erred in denying the approval of the deed of sale and in ruling that the obligation was personal to the heirs, not enforceable in the testate proceedings.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the probate court’s order. The agreement between Isabel, Carlos Gil, Jr., and Cancio was for their support during estate administration, which is within the purview of allowances for support under Article 1430 of the Civil Code. The probate court’s initial approval under Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court was proper, as a sale beneficial to heirs can be authorized. The condition on final adjudication became inconsequential because the properties were inherited by Isabel and then by Carlos Gil, Jr.’s children, charged with the commitment to Cancio. Dolores, as co-administratrix, was estopped from disputing the sale since she herself petitioned for its approval. An heir can sell their interest in property under administration, a matter within the probate court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the probate court erred in requiring a separate action. The motion for approval of the deed of sale was granted.